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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Proble m Statement 
The task of assessing the risks to the public from potential accident scenarios 
involving commercial nuclear power plants achie\'ed prominence during the early 
1970s with the ( .. Reactor afety tudy \. Ini tially sponsored by the l". . ~u­
clear Regulatory Commission ( ~RC ), this study, which was based on probabilistic 
methods introduced the use of fault trees and event trees which are needed to per-
form such comprehensive risk assessments '. ! ]. 
A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is used to determine the failure prob-
ability of important systems of a power plant. o far. all PRA studies haYe been 
carried out by developing fault trees. A fau lt tree is a graphic model of the various 
parallel and sequential combinations of fau lts that will result in the occurrence of 
a pre-defined undesired event. _..\ fault tree depicts the logical interrelationships of 
basic events that lead to an undesired event, which is called the top event of the 
fault tree ·1]. The end products of fault tree analysis are lists of components whose 
fail ures cause t he top event. These li sts are called cutsets. 
The reactor safety study, which was conducted under the direction of Professor 
~orman Rassmussen. is called \YA H-1..J:OO :2 . The main task of this study was 
to estimate the risk to the public using PR...\ methods, mainly fault tree analysis. 
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for two types of then-modern nuclear reactors: the urry 1 78 -:..I\\' ( e ) Pressurized 
Water Reactor (P\VR) and the Peach Bottom 2 1065-).I\\" (e) Boiling \Yater Reactor 
(B\VR) [3J. Although the scope of WASH-1-100 was only the analysis of these two 
reactors, the report has been used extensively as a benchmark for the safety analysis 
of nuclear power plants ever since. eventeen contractors and national laboratories 
were required 3 for comple ting \V:\SH-1400: therefore. it is apparent t hat a PRA 
analysis requires a great deal of effort. 
In an attempt to automate fault tree analysis, computer codes have been de-
veloped. These codes a re restricted by the memory size and speed of the computer 
that is used . ). lode rn main frame computers have large memory and high execution 
speed capabilities, so the use of these codes is possible but very expensive:. they 
are also error- prone for analysis of large systems such as a re encountered in nuclear 
power plants [ l 1 . 
Fo r this thesis, we developed an expert system called . Expert ystem for Ana-
lyzing Systems (ESAS ), to find the cutsets without performing fault tree analysis. 
This is accomplished by simply tracing through the system. The method first fo rms 
lists of components which consist of all possible combinations of components in t he 
system. Then. assuming t he fai lure of components in each lis t, ESAS tries to find 
paths from the input to the out put components. Depending on the type of accident . 
which can be an existence of a path between the inpu t and the output component. 
ESAS decides whether the li s t o f components (assumed failed ) is a cutset. 
This method is analogous to finding paths in a road map when certain roads 
have been closed due to bad weather , for example. lf our desire is to reach the 
destination (e.g .. going home) and we cannot reach it t hen we call the list of roads 
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closed a cutset. On the other hand, if we have no desire to reach the destination 
(e.g. going to the dentist ) and there is a path possible then the list of roads open is 
a cutset. Al though this idea is simple. application of it to the complex systems in 
a nuclear power plant is very tedious if performed manually. This implies that de-
veloping an expert system to per form this task is most appropriate: expert systems 
lend themselves to problem areas where the expertise is well defined, but tedious if 
resolved by humans. 
Cutsets found for a top event 10 a system are stored in a database and used 
for two purposes: to calculate the probability of occurrence of a top event, and 
to diagnose a system. Given the failure probability rates for each component in 
the system. E .-\S is capable of finding the total failure probability of the system. 
assurrung a cons tant failure rate. 
known and t he causes are desired. 
[n diagnosing a system, the consequences are 
Another way of defining cutsets is that the 
components in the cutsets are possible causes of the top event (consequence). Given 
the consequence (top event ) of an accident . ESA carries out a diagnosis by listing 
the components in the cutset that we re previously fou nd. Another diagnostic feature 
of ESAS is providing "what if" scenarios . The path-finding procedure could be 
used in the case where the importance of success of components in the system is 
examined by trying to find paths through the system, assuming the failure of those 
components. Thus, E .-\S could be applied to assist in conducting P RA studies or 
to advise the operator or staff who are diagnosing an omalies. 
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1.2 S co p e o f Thesis 
For describing the development and implementation of ESA , some background 
information in three areas , namely expert systems, fault t ree analysis, and Prolog, 
is required. 
In Chapter 1, ection 1.3 . a brief history of a rt ifi cial intelligence (AI ) and t he 
evolutionary stages which lead to the development of expert systems are described. 
A more formal definition and descriptions of expert systems in use today are pre-
sented in Section 1.4 with emphasis on two major components of an expert system, 
the inference engine and knowledge base. 
In Chapter 2, the literature review is chosen to serve three purposes, namely to 
give the reader an overview of the problem areas in t he nuclear indust ry fo r which 
the implementation of expert systems has been considered, to demonst rate the need 
for a method other than fault t ree analysis which could be used to find cutsets. and 
to summarize the methods used in exper t systems, which are also used in ESAS. 
for knowledge representat ion and diagnostics. A brief history of AI in the nuclear 
industry, a review of computer programs for fault tree analysis, and a summary of 
exper t systems for diagnostics is also presented. 
In Chapter 3 a brief descri p t ion of fault t ree analysis is given. The basic steps 
followed in fault tree const ruction and evaluatio n a re described. The scope of this 
thesis did not allow for an elaborate description of fault t ree an alysis methods, but 
the terms commonly used in faul t tree analysis and methods used to develop ESAS 
are defined . 
In Chapter 4, to give non-P rolog-programmers proper background information 
fo r understanding the parts of ES..\ presented in the later chap ters. a short manual 
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on Prolog is presented. Knovvledge representation and iterative techniques are the 
topics cO\·ered. Also. the Prolog software used to develop ESAS is bri efl y described. 
In Chapter 5, the information acquired by E A for performing its tasks, 
namely find ing paths and cutsets and performing diagnostics, is described. The 
representation o f this information, encoding facts into Prolog. is t hen explained. To 
completely present the knowledge base of ESA , which is comprised of facts and 
rules, the methods used for developing the rules which enables ESA to perform its 
various tasks, are described. F inal ly, the interfacing featu res of ESAS wit h the user 
are described. 
In Chapter 6, the cutsets found. usmg E A , for four nuclear power plant 
systems are reported and compared to the ones obtai ned by performing fault tree 
analysis . Also , some diagnostics features of ESAS are demonstrated by use of these 
system. 
In Chapter 7 , conclusions and the restrictions on the systems that can be 
analyzed by ESAS are reviewed. followed by suggestions for future work. 
1.3 A Short His tory o f Arti fi cia l Intellig ence 
It is difficult to pinpoint an exact star ting date for the introduction of the term 
commonly called artificial intelligence ( AI) . However, the term artificial intelligence 
is credited to \ Iarvin \!Iinsky at the \ Iassachusetts Inst itute of Technology (\IIT), 
who in 1961 wrote a paper entitled "Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence" 4 .. The 
1960s were a period of intense optimi sm over the possibility of making a computer 
think. During that decade, the first compu ter ized mathematical t heorem-proving 
program. ~ I AC Y\IA , and the famous program that acted like a psychoanalyst. 
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ELIZA, were developed. The development of these pioneer programs in AI was 
possible due to the creation of LISP, which is claimed to be the first AI language. 
It was created by John ~1cCarthy at ~IIT ,4]. 
Even before the 1960s it was well known that computers could do numerical 
calculations with an unbelievable speed. but ~IIT's ~IACSYMA went one step fur-
ther by performing symbolic processing of mathematical fo rmulas using knowledge 
required for matrix multiplication , integration, differentiation , etc. The develop-
ment of ~IACSY~IA has been continued to this date [5: . ELIZA was programmed 
to act like a Rogerian psychoanalyst. In this style of analysis, the psychiatrist takes 
a passive role, by simply echoing the patient's own remarks. Development of ELIZA 
raised the question, ·'Should computers be used in this way?" Even vVeizenbaum, 
ELIZA 's creator, in one of his books discredited his own program :4J. Schildt [4] 
blames the pessimism about the AI methods, which existed in the 1960s , on the 
fear of automation. 
Never theless, one can not deny the successes of the researchers in the AI field 
in the 1960s. As a matter of fact. in the beginning of the 1970s, it was believed 
that the capability to produce a program which has human-like intelligence com-
patibili ties was just imminent :5J. But difficulties were encountered in generalizing 
these successes into flexible, intelligent programs. Even with the 1970s computers, 
which had larger memory and much increased computer speed. it was soon found 
that AI programs exhausted computer memory or the execution time became too 
long. This directed the AI field to produce more efficient methods for solving AI 
problems, which in turn led to the introduction of the first commercial product. the 
expert system. An expert system is defined as a program that contains knowledge 
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about a certain field and, when interrogated, responds much like a human expert 
[4]. :\ new era in AI history began. augmented by the development of ~IYCL , 
one of the first expert systems. l\IYCL was developed at Stanford university to 
help physicians diagnose illnesses [51 • Mostly due to the success of MYCIN, the 
possibilities of developing expert systems in many other fields of technology have 
been or are being explored. 
Another language, called Prolog (Programming in Logic), was created in 1972 
by Alain Celmerauer in Marseilles, France, in an attempt to create an Al language 
that was more efficient for represent ing knowledge and drawing inferences [4]. Like 
LISP, Prolog is a language designed to solve ...\.I -related problems; but unlike LISP, 
it has several special features, such as a built-in database and a rather simple syntax 
[4]. Before 1981 , LISP was the language prominently used by the :\I field in the 
United States and Prolog was used in Europe. This situation was altered in 1981 
with the announcement by the Japanese that Prolog wi ll be used as the language 
for the "fifth-generation" computers '-( 
vVi th all the research done to this day, the ...\.I field still has not yet accomplished 
its stated task of creating programs that exhibit reasoning and learning processes 
similar to humans. However , it must be noted that the shortcomings of the AI field 
a re mostly blamed on the lack of understanding of how the human brain actually 
works. To this day, AI researchers have had to guess how a human brain works . It 
has been stated [6], 
"Although the AI field has been an active one for more than 25 years , 
AI researchers still have no idea how to create a truly intelligent com-
puter. . o existing programs can recall facts, solve problems. reason, 
learn, or process language with anything approximating human facility. 
This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to 
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human brains but because we do not yet know how human intelligence 
is organized."' 
On the other hand, it is ironic t hat the psychology field has actually taken some 
o f the AI concepts to develop psychological theo ries, as is a lso stat ed in Anderson 
·' obsen·ing how we could analyze the intelligent behavior of a machine 
has largely liberated us from our inhibitions and misconceptions about 
analyzing our own intelligence." 
T he field of Artificial Intelligence today is separated into four areas. natural-
language processing . vision and pattern recognition , robotics . and expert systems . 
The source fo r the description of these areas is Schildt '1J. Development of natural-
language p rocessing is claimed to be t he most important task in t he AI field, since 
if this is full y accomplished then a direc t human-computer communication link is 
possible. ~atural - language processing is not fully developed due to the sheer size 
and complexity of the human language. 
Along with natural-language processing, for a computer to be ab le to com-
pletely unders ta nd the world around it , some sort of vision capability is required . 
Often the term .. image processing" is used to describe the fairly broad field of vision 
and pattern recognition. and enh ancement. The reason for t his fie ld being so large 
is that it encompasses two major subdivisions: two-dimensional processing and the 
three-dimensional processing (sometimes called real-world processing). 
T he roboti cs field is basically a combination of ot her fields of AI. ~atural-
language processing is used, so a robot can communicate with humans in a human 
language. Vision and pattern recognition enables a robot to visuali ze and to have 
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between algorithms and heuristics. Algorithms are procedures guaranteed to resuJt 
in the correct solution of problems. For example. the procedure for multiplication 
is an algorithm. By following the same procedure, one would obtain the correct 
solution for any two numbers. However , concluding that it will rain because it 
is cloudy is a heuristic. In other words, algorithms are a brute fo rce method of 
sol\'ing problems which if follo\\'ed exactly will result in the correct ans\\'er. whereas 
heuristics are short cuts for solving problems but do not always result in the correct 
solution (sometimes it does not rain on a cloudy day). Then why use heuristics 
and not algorithms? The answer lies in the fact t hat the re is not an algorithm for 
every problem. For example, there is not a systematic way of predicting rain which 
always gives the correct forecast. 
Human experts rely on heuristics 10 their decision making, and in order to 
be able to mimic them, expert systems contain a knowledge base which can hold 
information in the form of heuristics, or other fo rms of knowledge used by humans. 
Furthermore, expert systems contain an inference mechanism ·which controls the 
execution and draws inferences from the the knowledge base [7:. Some of t he most 
important features of an expert system that are cited : indicate that an expert 
system should: 
• cover a limited domain of expertise, 
• explain its train of reasoning , 
• detach facts and inference mechanism, 
• allow modularity, 
HUMAN EXPERT 
MACHINE LEARNING 
INDUCTION STRATEGIE 
REPR ESENTATION OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
METHOD OF 
PLAUSIBLE REASONING 
s 
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DATABASE 
I I 
AQU I SIT ION 
MODULE 
I 
KNOWLEDGE 
BASE 
I THE HUMAN WINO 
INFERENCE EXPLANATORY 
ENG I NE - INFERENCE 
F igure 1.1: Expert system framework 
• incorporate rules of thumb that human experts use, 
• deliver advice as its output, 
• and most importantly, make money. 
ow 
_..\ typical block st ructure of an expert system is presented in F igure 1.1 :6J. 
As depicted in this figure, the kernels or core components of an expert system are 
the knowledge base and the inference engine. However , the component "the .human 
window" should not be overlooked. r-. Iost expert system languages contain excellent 
graphics capabilities and window systems. Since expert systems are competing with 
the human experts' interact ive capabilities, full exploration of this aspect is crucial. 
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1.4 .1 Knowledge B ase 
The knowledge base stores information about the subject domain. Common 
difficulties encountered while building a knowledge base are knowledge represen-
tation (how to encode informatio n so the computer can use it ), and knowledge 
acquisition 71• Knowledge representation in an expert system must contain : 1. 
• domain terms , the jargon used by experts in t he field 
• structural relationships, the interconnection of component entities 
• causal relationships, the cause-effect relations between components 
Knowledge acquisition consists of two parts: acquiring the knO\\·ledge which the 
human expert uses in solving a problem, and collecting the data the human expert 
needs to solve a problem. Acquiring the knowledge poses a problem, since in most 
cases the human expert 's knowledge on how to solve a problem (e.g., heuristics ) is 
ill-defined and not well understood even by the expert. In general, the re are four 
main methods of storing knowledge symbolically [ : 
• Production rules which have an IF (.-\) THE, (B) format . where the condi-
tion (.-\) specifies some pattern and the conclusion (B) may be an action or 
assertion. Production rules are used for representing heuristics o r other rules 
in the form of (IF condition T HE:\ conclusion ). 
• Semanti c domains, which are knowledge linked together in the form of a tree 
or graph. The human brain also stores information in the form of a semantic 
domain. For example , when one thinks about rain, the brain immediately 
links it with snow cloud. etc. 
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• Frames, which are generalized record structures that may have default values 
and may ha\·e actions coded as the \·alue of certain fields or slots. 
• Horn clauses, which are a form of predicate logic on which Prolog is based. 
1.4.2 Infe rence Engine 
The inference engine is used to reach conclusions and to control the reasoning 
process :1J. In simpler words , it is the part of the expert system which thinks through 
the knowledge it has acquired. Inference engines are of either a deterministic or a 
probabilistic type. \\'hen one deals with a knowledge area where assertions are 
certain. deterministic inference engines are used. On the other hand. probabilistic 
inference engines deal with the type of knowledge such that an assertion is associated 
with an assigned probability. The majority of knowledge areas are probabilistic, 
but for many of these areas . the uncertainty is stat istically insignificant, so the 
determinis tic inference engine is mostly used 7'. Probabilistic or deterministic 
inference engines use either forward or backward-chaining methods. 
Forward-chaining is the term used to describe the process of working forward 
from the evidence to the conclusions. Forward-chaining is sometimes called data-
driven because the inference engine uses information that is provided by the user 
to mo\·e through a network of logical A~Ds and ORs until it reaches a terminal 
point. which is the object. If the inference engine cannot find an object by using 
the existing information. then it requests additional data. In summary. a forward-
chaining inference engine moves through the rules that define the object and creates 
a path that leads to the next rule; therefore, the only way to reach the object is to 
satisfy all of it rules "7' . 
1-! 
Backward-chaining is working from hypothesis to evidence. the reverse of forward-
chaining. It starts ·with an object and requests information to confirm or deny it. 
T hus, it is somet imes called object-driven because the system begins with an object 
and t ries to ve ri fy it . 
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2 LITERATU RE REVIEW 
The main purpose of this review ts to demonstrate the differences between 
ESAS and other programs which perform fault tree analysis and to give a descrip-
tion of some expert systems used for diagnosing systems in nuclear power plants. 
However , to give an overall picture of the use of AI in the nuclear industry, a sum-
mary of a paper titled " Application of Artificial Intelligence in the C.S. Nuclear 
Industry" [9] is presented. 
2.1 AI in the Nuclear Indus try 
In the publication titled , "Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Com-
puter Applications in the ~ uclear Industry" [10:, a broad collection of papers on 
the application of AI programs to the nuclear industry' s problem areas is presented. 
In the summary article in the publication, hrig :9J cites the problem areas where 
implementation of expert systems have been successful. 
According to Chrig, the development of expert systems in the nuclear industry 
in the United States is conducted by a broad list of organizations, including nuclear 
equipment vendors. architect-engineer firms, universities. national laboratories, fed-
eral agencies, the electric power utility industry, and small entrepreneurial groups. 
However, the largest effort is the program undertaken in 1983 by the Electric Power 
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Research Institute (EPRI). Special interests are in the areas of fault recognition 
and diagnosis, fault recovery, task planning, intelligent operator interfaces , and in-
telligent systems control. 
Uhrig pays special attention to the use of expert system in operator assistance. 
He argues that the use of expert systems in assisting reactor operation is most ap-
propriate, since great quantities of numeric , symbolic, and quant itative information 
are handled by the reactor operators even during routine operation. Processing 
large amounts of information in an abnormal situation is even more difficult and 
at the same time crucial. Also, the performance of operators at a nuclear power 
plant is affected by the stress caused in handling such large amounts of informa-
tion. This causes a great deal of guesswork on the part of the operators. Expert 
systems can avoid this problem by providing expert advice and rapid access to a 
large information base. Uhrig states: 
"The application of AI technologies , particularly expert systems. to the 
control room activities can reduce operator error and enhance plant 
safety and reliability. Furthermore, a large number of non-operating 
activities (e .g. testing, routine maintenance, outage planning, equip-
ment diagnostics, fuel management, etc. ) exist where expert systems 
can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of overall plant operation." 
In regards to the computers used in the control rooms, he notes that micro-
computers are preferred by the operators, since they are easy to work with. Expert 
systems can be developed for the special AI computers, such as LISP machines, and 
the executable version of the programs can be transferred to the microcomputers in 
the control room. The major problem with implementing expert systems for assist-
ing in operation of nuclear power plants is the reluctance of utilities to introduce to 
regulatory review , a new technology that involves a great deal of uncertainty. Cntil 
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they are convinced that the benefits gained warrant the effort involved, any further 
development of these expert systems will be slowed down. 
uhrig then cites some expert systems typical of the ones being developed in 
the U.S. which are ac tually in use at nuclear power plants today. They a re briefly 
itemized here '9], 
• Reactor Emergency Alarm Level \ Ionitor (REAL\I ), deYeloped by Technology 
Applications, Inc., implemented to assist in deciding the response to each level 
of emergency (i.e., unusual event. an alert, a site area emergency, o r a general 
emergency). 
• An EPRI-developed tracking system for emergency operating procedure. It 
is an on-li ne exp ert system that requires no input from the operator, an d can 
explain the conclusions reached upon the request of the operator. 
• An expert system called CLEO, developed by \\'estinghouse Hanford Com-
pany, and used for refueling the fast flux test facility (FFTF). It is able to 
generate a list of necessary refueling moves in less than 30 seconds, given the 
present and t he future core configurations of FFTF. 
• An expert system, developed by the Oak Ridge ~ational Laboratory (OR\iL ), 
used for advising operators of the ORNL 's 100 ~IWt high flux isotope reactor. 
• An expert system developed at ldaho ~ ational Engineering Laboratory for 
reactor safety assessment. Its main task is to aid an NRC reactor safety team 
to maintain a '·big picture" of a transient-in- progress. 
• Trip Buffer Expert System (TRIBES), developed by :\Iiddle South Ctilities for 
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trip analysis caused by the core protection calculator and the control element 
assembly calculator . The calculators form a group of six digi tal computers 
that monitor nuclear power plant parameters and control parameter posi tions. 
These core protection systems initiate a trip to prevent violation of fuel design 
limits. After a t rip , the analysis of the output of these calculato rs is required 
before t he plant can be restar ted. 
• An expert system, developed by Stone and Webster , used for analyzing the 
limiting conditions of operation (LCO) and technical specificat io ns in a nuclear 
power plant. 
• PLEXSYS (plant expert system), for presenting piping and instrumentation 
drawings , and electri cal on-line schematics. PLEXSYS is integrated with a 
conventional program called T AGS (Tagout Administration and Generation 
System) . This integrated system can recommend a "safety tagout boundary" 
which allows the maintenance to be performed without danger of t ripping 
the plant . TAGS was developed by Southern California Edison for their San 
Onofre Nuclear Power Plant . 
• GenAID , an on-line generator diagnostic system, to diagnose 15 conditions 
with damage potential to the generator and to recommend corrective action 
for each conilition. Develo pers were Texas Utili ties and Westinghouse. 
• Generic Diagnostic System (GDS ) software shell of Combust ion Engineering , 
which is used for developing expert system for power plant diagnostics. 
• At Ohio State university. an exper t system to diagnose operational problems 
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in nuclear power plants even in the presence of some incorrect and / or conflict-
ing data is being developed. It uses classification techniques that can diagnose 
a large percentage of anomalies found in most mechanical systems. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the problem areas where the development of expert 
systems have been mostly emphasized. The areas which the Department of En-
ergy (DOE ) has supported through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR ) 
program are the following [9], 
• "An expert system operator aid for nuclear power plant maneuvers," Applied 
Research Associated , Inc. 
• "An expert system decision aid for reactor trip reduction and post trip anal-
ysis ," Expert-EASE Systems, Inc. 
• "Signal validation by combining model-based and evidential reasornng ap-
proaches,'' Expert-EASE Systems, Inc. 
• "The design of a reliable fuzzy fault-tolerant automatic control," Technology 
International, Inc. 
• "A bayesian diagnostic system: an expert system to aid reactor operation," 
Pickard , Lowe and Garrick, Inc. 
• "Residual heat removal advisor,'' Odetics, Inc. 
Uhrig concludes his report by forecasting an inevitable demand for automation 
of most functions of the nuclear power plants due to demands for increased safety 
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margins. lower environmental impacts , increased performance, and greater invest-
ment protection. Also, he recognizes the fact that AI and expert systems must 
play a major role in assuring the regulators and the public of plants being properly 
designed , built, operated, and maintained. 
2 .2 R eview of Com puter Progra m s Used for Fault Tree Ana lys is 
In this section. a brief description of some expert systems and conventional 
programs that we re developed to perform or to assist in performing fault tree anal-
ysis is presented. Readers, not familiar wit h the method of fault tree analysis. may 
\.Yish to refer to Chapter 3 for a better understanding of the programs described 
next. 
An expert system was developed by Forgner to assist in the construction of 
fault trees [11:. This expert system can help a fault tree analyst to produce a high 
quality fault tree by alleviating the fou r major difficulties associated with fault tree 
construction. namely , 11:: 
• The drawing and input of the initial set of fault trees is time-consuming. 
• As the risk analysis proceeds, more and more effort is required to update the 
fault trees and to ascertain that they remain consistent. 
• There is a problem of coordination when more than one person is inrnlved in 
the drawing and updating of the fault trees . 
• As fault trees for subsystems are assembled into an overall plant fault tree . 
logical loops frequently occur. These loops must be broken before the trees 
can be analyzed by conventional fault tree codes. 
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The use of work-s tations promotes the success of this exper t system in improving 
conti nuity in the thought process of the fault tree de\·elopment. The key cont ribu-
tion of this expert sys tem is the ability to very effecti\'ely resolve logical loops in 
the fault trees. Knowledge Engineering Environment (KEE) was the expert sys tem 
shell used fo r developing t hi s expert system. KEE is a product of IntelliCorp. 
Another exper t system in the area of PR.A. called EX.PRES , is used for the 
automation of reliabili ty studies ·12: . Automation was fi rst applied to the con-
st ruction of t he fault t rees used to assess the reliability of static thermal hyd raulic 
systems. The term "static thermal hydraulic system" suggests that t here are not 
any changes in the system configuration du ring the accident. For example. valves 
which a re open in itially, remain open . In the second phase of automation, a fault 
tree fo r elect ri c power systems was built by trying to maintain the same approach 
( knowledge and reasoning) as the approach used fo r the thermal hydraulic systems . 
The knowledge representati on of EXPRESS is based on its two inference en-
gines. ALO GETTE and LRC developed by Direction des Etudes et Recherches at 
EDF. ALO UETTE is a n infe rence engine which utilizes forward chaining with a 
knowledge representation based on production rules (if.. .t hen ... ) and facts which 
a re represented as triplets (ob ject. relation, object). L RC is a language used to 
represent knowledge in prepositional zero order logic. [n zero o rder logic, clauses 
contain at most one conclusion. In EXPRESS. the backward chaining inference 
capability of LRC is used for building a fault t ree start ing from undes irable events . 
The methods implemented by EXPRESS are based on the basic observat ion 
that failures relati ng to the components of a the rmal h,·draulic sntem can always be . . . 
grouped under a few large categories, for example, fluid flow interruption (blockage) , 
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and loss of fluid (external leak). Based on this observation, EXPRESS , in the first 
phase, reduces t he number of components of t he system by grouping them into 
larger component categories (macro-components), according to the consequences of 
their failures (blockage or leakage ) . In the second phase the failure consequences 
are deduced for each component in terms of path losses, according to the macro-
component( s) to which the component studied belongs. The result of these two 
phases is a rule based program in the LRC language. By adding a hand wri tten 
rule base for undesirable events and boundary condi t ions, the LRC program can 
then be used to build a fault tree for the system studied. EXPRESS has successfully 
been used to study some static thermal hydraulic systems in the PAL uEL nuclear 
power plant. 
In summary, EXPRESS must have access to both backward and forward-
chaining inferen ce mechanisms. The former is required for cons t ructing fault trees 
and the latter for resolving t hem. T his is typical of most exper t systems developed 
for fault tree analysis , which unfortunately causes complexities. 
In Vessely [l ], conventional computer codes for performing fault tree analysis 
are categorized into qualitative and quantitative analysis. Qualitati ve analysis in-
cludes computation of cutsets which only depends on the structure of the fault tree. 
In contrast , probabilistic assessment is called the quant itative evaluation of the fault 
tree . The division between qualitative and quantitati ve aspec ts developed naturally 
because probabilistic an alysis often involves repeated evaluation of the t ree [l ]. The 
major difficulty with quali tati ve analys is. using computer codes. is computer storage 
and time requiremen ts, even for analyses of medium size fault t rees. This problem 
is partially handled by limiting the maximum number of components in a cutset. 
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For example. in \VASH-1-100 '2] only t he single and double cutsets were considered, 
since cutsets containing more than two components become insignificant due to 
thei r low probability of occurrence. 
The Efficient Logic Reduction of Fault Trees EL RAFT , written in Fortran IV 
for the CDC 6600, is capable of finding cutsets for up to six basic events for the 
top event and other specified intermediate events. It uses the unique factorization 
property of the natural numbers to find the cutsets of a fault tree. It assigns a unique 
prime number to each basic event. A bottom-up algorithm is used to process the 
tree. Cutsets, for the gates at successively higher levels. are represented by the 
product of the numbers associated with thei r input events. The major drawback of 
ELRAFT is that, for large trees, the product of the prime factors can soon exceed 
the capacity of the machine. 
Another code for finding cutsets is ALLCUTS 1' developed by the Atlantic 
Richfield Company. It is written in Fortran IV and CO\lPASS (assembly language) 
for t he CDC 6600 computer. ALLCGTS can compute the top event probability, sort 
and print up to 1000 cutsets in descending order of probability, and select cutsets in 
a specified probability range. It handles up to 175 basic events and '"125 gate events. 
ALLCUTS is coupled with a graphics program which produces a plot of the fault 
tree based on the fault tree input description . Also, t here is another program which 
can be used to check the input and cross reference the gates and input e\·ents used 
in ALLCt.;T . ALLCGTS uses a top-down algorithm. In a top-down algorithm, 
cutsets are calculated by successive substitution into the gate equations beginning 
with the top even t and working down the t ree until a ll gates have been replaced by 
basic events. For an elaborate description of top-down and bottom-up algorithms 
refer to Chapter YII of Vessely [l ]. 
Programs which conduct a qualitative analysis are given the manually con-
structed fault tree as an input. The . uclear Technology Systems Division (NTSD) 
of Westinghouse Electric Corporation [13], developed an interactive graphic fault 
tree editor called GRAPHER which could convert fault tree data into the appro-
priate computer code input file. With the aid of a computer-aided design (CAD) 
system, L TSO developed an approach for representing fluid systems within a CAD 
database using associated software capable of converting the database information 
into a fault tree model. This fault tree model is then supplied to the automated 
fault tree (AFT) software, which is provided with Individual P lant Evaluation (IPE) 
rules. The IPE consists of detailed fault tree guideline for PvVRs. By using these 
guidelines and the fault tree model, AFT is then able to construct the fault tree. 
The input for computer codes which perform quantitative evaluations of fault 
trees consist of two parts: (1) cutsets , and (2) failure rates. Given the above in-
puts , several types of quantitative results may be computed including: numerical 
probabilities (probabilities of system and component failures) , quantitative impor-
tance (quantitative ratings of contributions to the system failure), and sensitivity 
evaluations (effects of changes in models and data, error bounding). 
2 .3 E x p e rt Sys t em s D evelo p ed for Diagnos tics 
In general , expert systems developed for diagnostics either use event-oriented, 
or a function-oriented knowledge base, or both. The event-oriented knowledge base 
is based on a fault model which requires some relationship between cause and symp-
tom. The function-oriented knowledge base includes an understanding of the func-
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tion of each component in the system being diagnosed. In the event-oriented knowl-
edge base a component is considered either failed or operable. on t he other hand, 
in the function-oriented knowledge base, the input and output parameters of each 
component is studied to decide whether a component is functioning properly or not. 
ln the following descriptions of the expert systems. some of the forms of these two 
types of knowledge bases are illustrated. 
A knowledge based system for plant diagnosis, has been deYeloped by Kiguchi 
et al. 14. . This expert system basically performs three tasks, suspect pick up, 
suspect discrimination and , if necessary, test generation and evaluation. First the 
event-oriented knowledge. the causality relationships , is used to identify t he cause 
or possible suspects. [f the cause is found then the expert system turns to the guid-
ance phase. Otherwise, it looks for function-oriented knowledge, wh ich describes 
structure, behavior and status of the plant, to further discriminate between the 
suspects. Thus, two types of knowledge are used . a causality descrip t ion which is 
a cause and consequence relationship. and a system description which includes an 
intended structure and expected behavior of the system. The former uses knowl-
edge of anomalous situations and thus is event-oriented , whereas. the lat te r uses 
the knowledge of normal situations and is function-oriented. In comparison. the 
former is more efficient because it is direct, but requires all anomalous si tuations to 
be covered . The latter is less efficient because it is indirect. but it is more p owerful. 
since it is much easier to describe how the system should wo rk. 
The function-oriented knowledge is represented in the form of frame structures 
corresponding to real plant schematics and event-oriented knowledge is embedded 
around these frames. This expert system is written in LISP and Fortran, on an 
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.(improved" LISP interpreter which has a fast memory management capability. Fast 
data transfer between two languages, LISP and Fortran , is required. since time is 
an important factor in diagnos tics. \' umerical calculations are done by Fortran 
programs and LISP is used for writing the programs which perform the sy mbolic 
manipulations. The function and event-oriented knowledge bases require forward 
and backward-chaining inference engines respectively which are provided by this 
expert system. 
Kiguchi et al. 14] describe an application study for diagnosis of a BWR by 
numerical simulat ions and show that it is possible to diagnose multiple events in 
the time sequence of their occurrence. Appropriate guidance can be given well 
in advance due to the good predication capability. When something unexpected 
happens that cannot be explained by its knowledge, the method tells what cannot 
be explained, which would support human decision making. 
A unique expert system which uses a model -based display. is being developed 
by Beltracchi 15. . In this expert system a model-based display is identified. dis-
cussed. and illustrated . The model used in the display is based on the Rankine 
Cycle, a heat engine cycle. The individual control panels within a control room 
of a nuclear power plant contain meters. indicators , gauges. control stations. and 
switches, etc . The processing o f the data of a heat engine cycle acquired from the 
panel could be presented in a Rankine cycle. which is depicted in a temperature 
versus entropy plot. In this plot the entropy values are not significant to the opera-
tor ; howeve r . the temperatures are useful. The data required for the Rankine cycles 
of all anomalies possible, depicted on a temperature ve rs us entropy plot. could be 
obtained by assimilating anomalies in a thermal hydrauli c system and storing them. 
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During operation, the anomaly is identified by matching the current Rankine cycle 
with the already stored ones, using different pattern matching techniques. Beltrac-
chi claims that the Rankine cycle of each anomaly is unique , so that this method 
is feasible for diagnostics. In developing ESAS, methods such as the one used by 
Belt racchi could have been employed in order to decrease the number of suspects. 
However, the primary objective was to not specialize the analysis to a system or 
system type. 
A part of the ESAS's knowledge base is t he semantic network representation 
of the system being analyzed. The benefits of this type of knowledge representation 
is demonstrated in the expert system developed by Kitamura et al. [16]. In this 
knowledge representation the physical connections of components in a system are 
known. Also as its knowledge base, this expert sys tem is provided with a list of 
causes of all possible malfunctions (primal events). The failure diagnosis consis ts of 
two stages: a signal processing stage for anomaly detection and an inference stage 
or primal events identification. The signal processing stage analyzes the differences 
between predicted and measured values of process signals to detect subtle changes 
in the signals induced by an anomaly. After verifying the signals, the causes of an 
anomaly are found by scanning through the knowledge database to determine the 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with observations. 
Kitamura et al. [16] state that this exhaustive search might seem tedious and 
impractical, but that the search is performed quite rapidly, owing to the simple 
structure of the semantic network. They note that the applicability of the semantic 
network representation of plant architecture as a basic technique for failure diagnosis 
was confirmed through simulation studies of a PWR reactor. This expert system 
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1s written in Prolog and implemented on an ACS-1000 computer ("'.'J"EC Co.) of 
Tohoku University Computer Center and utilizes an upgraded Prolog Processor 
named SHAPEuP. 
The knowledge contained in PRA models can aid in emergen cy res ponse deci-
sion making, as noted by Dixon and Ferns [17] who state, 
"PRA techniques are used by the nuclear industry to model the potential 
response of a reactor subjected to unusual conditions. The knowledge 
contained in these models can aid in emergency response decision mak-
ing." 
PRA models can assist the operations personnel in both short and long term decision 
making. Given the current plant conditions an on-line PRA could identify quickly 
which cooling sources and flow paths are available or unavailable. This would permit 
the oper ator to identify quickl y which resources to use based on the priority list. In 
addition to the identification of current success paths, a PRA model can effectively 
identify the weak links in those paths, thus predicting the occurrence of a possible 
accident in the longer term [l 7]. 
Long term accident planning is useful for two main reasons [17]: (1) the current 
status of a component may degrade over a period of t ime (e.g., if ventilation sys-
terns are currently failed, components of other systems will o\·erheat and fail over 
time) and fo reseeing such failures without consult ing PRA models can be easily 
overlooked , and (2) the identification of any single failure conditions supports com-
prehension of sudden changes in plant trends; namely, due to failure of a component 
or components, all success paths may depend on a single component . Identifying 
this component is crucial. 
Dixon and Ferns [17] are developing an integrated set of computer programs 
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which utilizes AI techniques to develop, cultivate, and harvest information from 
PRA models composed of interrelated fault trees, event t rees , response trees, and 
other forms. The integrated system is called FORESTER. Existing components 
of FORESTER include the Integrated Fault / event TRee Engineering (IFTREE), 
the SeQUence Il\IPortance calculator (S QUL\IP ) and System Un-.\Iaintainability 
Assessment Code (SUYIAC). IFTREE supports the graphical construction and as-
sessment of fault trees and event trees cou pled to fault trees. SQUIYIP is a spe-
cialized code partially integrated with IFTREE. SQUIMP supports development 
and assessment of large event tree networks. SUMAC is a post processor which ac-
cepts cutsets and event probability and repair time distributions as input. SC'.\IAC 
then produces event, cutset, and un-maintainabilities and un-maintainabili ty impor-
tances for indicated repair periods. Un-maintainability is defined as the probability 
that the system, subsystem, or component of interest cannot be repaired in time T 
given that it is currently failed. The most recent de velopment in FORESTER, is 
a specialized analysis capability being integrated into IFTREE called "subset as-
sessment". A subset assessment of a model involves the specification of the events 
of interest and any cutoff parameters. The assessment results obtained from the 
model are those which meet the cutoff criteria and involve one or more of the events 
of interest . The cutoff criterion is basically a set ting of a minimum probability for 
the event or events which could occur. This capabili ty locates specialized groups of 
cutsets in an efficient and potentially real-time manner. Acco rding to Dixon and 
Ferns [17], 
"There are many applications for subset assessment, including identifica-
tion of risk associated with localized fires , terrorist attacks, maintenance 
errors, and any other problem involving a small group of components 
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in a large, complex faci li ty. I n the area o f emergency response, sub-
set assessment can identi fy the particular failure modes associated with 
equipment which is confirmed unavailable. It can a lso support ( what if ) 
activities." 
ES.AS, even tho ugh the cutsets are obtajned using a different method, uses a method 
siwlar to su bset assessment in providing the user a .. ,,,hat if' reso urce. 
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3 A DESCRIPTION OF FAU LT TREE ANALYSIS 
As \Vas mentioned earlier, ESAS calculates cutsets without performing the fault 
tree analysis. However, for the purpose of defining some terms used for describing 
ESAS's method of finding cutsets, a brief description of faul t tree analysis 1s re-
quired. The description of fault tree analysis given here is taken from the Fault 
Tree Handbook [l ,. The Fault Tree Handbook was written to ser ve as a text for 
the system safety and reliability course, given to over 200 nuclear regulatory com-
mission personal and contractors and to make available to others a set of otherwise 
undocumented material on fault tree const ruction and evaluation . 
3.1 Construction of a Fa ult Tree 
In a fault t ree analysis, one must properly define the system, decide which 
component failure causes an accident in the system (select the top event ), form 
the fault tree for the top event selected, and resolve the fault tree for finding the 
cutsets corresponding to the chosen top event. Cutsets of a system are one o r a 
combination of components whose failure results in the failure of the system. 
To define a system, first the purpose of the sys tem analys is must be deter-
mined. For example, the analyses of whether a system fails in a hazardous way, 
or whether the system will prove more costly than originally anticipated, require 
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different system descriptions. For the purpose of fault tree analysis , a system is 
defined as, "a deterministic entity comprising an interacting collection of discrete 
elements [l ]." The term deterministic suggests that the system is identifiable. For 
example, the solar system is an identifiable system, but the entire universe is not. 
Furthermore, to define the interacting collection of discrete elements of a system 
properly, one must decide upon the boundary and resolution of the system. In 
deciding on boundaries of a system, one determines the comprehensiveness of the 
fault tree analysis, whereas the determination of resolution limits the detail of the 
analysis. Also, the interaction of elements in the systems of a nuclear power plants 
usually consists of a fl.ow of electrical current. steam water , etc. through all the 
components of a system. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the term . "ho-
mogeneous fl.ow" for describing a system with is a A.ow of only one type through the 
components of a system. 
A fault tree depicts the logical interrelationships of basic events that lead to the 
undesired event , which is the top event of the fault tree. Table IV-1 in \'essely ) ] 
contains the main components of a fault tree. Primary events are those events \••hich 
are chosen not to be developed any further in a fault tree. Four types of primary 
events are , (1) basic events, (2) undeveloped events , (3 ) conditional events, and(-!) 
external events. An intermediate event is a fault event which occurs because one or 
more primary or intermediate events cause it; in the representation , it propagates 
through the logic gates . In other \\·ords, a combination of intermediate events , 
combined and propagated by the usage of gates , result in another intermediate 
event or the top event. The logical relationship between the input events of a gate 
is decided by the gate type. Namely, an occurrence of the output event of an AND-
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gate, requires occurrence of all its input events, whereas, in the case of an OR-gate 
the occurrence of the output event depends on the occurrence of any of the input 
events. 
To better understand what primary and intermediate events are, let us distin-
guish between faults and failures. Faults and failures of components have different 
meanings in fault tree analysis . A failure is used when a component fails completely, 
whereas, a fault is used when a component does not function properly. Thus, all 
failures are faults but not all faults are failures. In forming a fault tree, one chooses 
a top event, and determines the events leading to it through a logic gate. The 
faults which lead to the top event become top events themselves. This procedure 
is repeated until the top event becomes the fault corresponding to the failure of a 
component. The failure of a component is referred to as a primary event. There-
fore, the top event and all intermediate events are faults and the primary events 
are failures . It must be noted that a component can fail in different ways . T hese 
are called failure modes. The rules for constructing fault trees are '. l ]: 
• Write the statements that are entered in the event boxes as faults ; state 
precisely what that fault is and when it occurs. 
• If this component fault consist of a component failure, classify the event as a 
"state-of-component". otherwise, as "state-of-system". 
• If "state-of-component", is the event add an OR-gate below the event. If 
"state-of-system" is the fault event , it may require a n OR-gate, AND-gate , or 
no gate at all. 
• If the normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, then 
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it is assumed that the component functions normally (no miracle rule ) . 
• All inputs to a par ticular gate should be completely defined before further 
analysis of any one of them is under undertaken. 
• Gate inputs should be properly defined fault events. amely, gates should 
not be connected with other gates directly. and similarly events should not be 
connected with other events directly. 
In summary, in a fault tree the events are termed " faults" if they are initiated 
by other events and are termed .. failures"' if they are the failure of a component. 
The gate output is the .. higher·· fault event under consideration and the gate inputs 
are the more basic "10\ver·' fault or failure events. o, in constructing a fault tree, 
one p roceeds from "higher" faul ts to the more basic or "lower" faults. 
3 .2 Evaluat ion of a Fault Tree 
For resolving fault trees, it is assumed that the reader has a background in 
Boolean algebra. Readers wishing more information on Boolean algebra can refer 
to \'essely ): or other common sources. Because gates relate events in exactly the 
same way as the Boolean operations. there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the Boolean algebra representation and the fault tree rep resentation. This process 
results in a Boolean expression. To find the list of cutsets, one could simplify 
this expression into sets of primary events related by OR-operators, and primary 
events within the sets a re related by ANO-operato rs. The simplification is done by 
following the rules of Boolean algebra depicted in Table \'11-2 of Vessely '.11• 
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In Figure 3.1 , a typical pumping system is presented. The following construc-
tion and evaluation of t he fault t ree for this system, is ob tained from Vessely [l ]. 
The fault t ree constructed for this system is presented in F igure 3.2. The sym-
bols for t he primary events of this system are shown in Figure 3.2. The Boolean 
expression derived from this fault tree is, 
T = ( .-\ - B --- C) . ( C - A . B ) 
(Note: ANDs are represented by(.) and ORs by ( ..L )) 
By following the Boolean algebra rules , one could simplify this expression into 
a list of cutsets, as is suggested in the following steps . 
T = ( A - B - C ) .(C ..L .-\.B) 
= A.C + A.A.B - B. C+ B.A.B + C .C + C.A .B 
= A.C + A.B + B. C - A.B +- C - .-\.B.C 
= C ..L (A .B ) 
Note that (C) and ( A . B ) are the cutsets. The cu tsets found imply, in order to 
not have any flow to the reactor from the tank, either valve C or pumps A and B 
must fail. 
In a PRA study of a system , one is interested in the actual probability of 
occurrence of a top event. After obtaining the cutsets , the failure probability of 
the system or probability of occurrence of the top event, could be calculated by 
simply replacing A~Ds and ORs with multiplication and addition respectively and 
assigning a failure probabili ty to each primary event . For example, assuming that 
t he probability of the failure of the tank and pump are 0.0001 and 0.02 respectively, 
then the failure probability of the pumping system depicted in Figure 3. 1 is 0.0005. 
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Figure 3.1: Configuration of a pumping system 
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Figure 3.2: The fault tree for the pumprng system 
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4 BASICS OF PROLOG 
:'Prolog (P rogramming in Logic) is a computer programming language 
that is used for solving problems t hat involve objects and relationships 
between objects" : 18 ~ . 
Prolog is based on Horn clauses. Horn clauses are developed to convey logic-
based ideas in a written form. For many ap plications of logic, it is sufficient to 
restrict t he form of clauses to those containing at most one conclusion. Clauses 
containing a t most one conclusion are called Horn clauses, because they were fi rst 
investigated by logician Alfred Horn [18]. Horn clauses are a subset of a formal 
system called predicate logic . Horn clauses a re said to be of order zero, since at 
most one conclusion is allowed in them [19]. The reader can refer to Stanat and 
:VIcAllister [20], for more on predicate logic and Horn clauses. It can be shown 
t hat any problem in logic can be expressed in a Horn clause form or as stated by 
Kowalski [19], 
"The majority of formalisms for computer programming bear greater 
resemblance to Horn clauses than they do to " non-Horn" clauses. In 
addition most of the models of problems which have been developed in 
a r tificial intelligence can be regarded as models for problems expressed 
by means of Horn clauses .. , 
In Section 4.1 , knowledge representation (facts and rules ) in Prolog, which are 
represented in the form of Horn clauses is descri bed. Iterati ve techniques in P rolog 
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are discussed in Section -L2. Turbo Prolog 21 is the software used to deYelop E AS. 
This software has some added features which are described in Section 4.3. There 
are many topics about P rolog which could be covered; but unfortunately the scope 
of thi s paper does not allow it. However, the materi al given here contains enough 
background information to help the reader understand the development of ESAS. 
T he reader can also refer to Schildt [-1], Shafer 221, :-. Ia rcus '.23:, :-.l alpas '24], and 
Clockst in and l\Iellish ) ] for a more elaborate discussion on P rolog. The source for 
the the following is the Turbo Prolog 2.0 l;se r 's Guide ·21:. Before beginning the 
d iscuss ion on P rolog it should be noted that example programs in Prolog ap pear in 
italics. 
4.1 Knowledge R epresentation in Prolog 
Knowledge re presentat ion in P rolog consists of declaring some facts about ob-
jects and their relationships , and defining some rules about objects and thei r rela-
tionships. These facts and rules a re in the form of Horn clauses. 
Facts consist of a predicate and its a rguments. A predicate could be an at-
tribute of or a relationship bet,Yeen arguments. For example. the following predi-
cates are att ributes of their arguments: 
English 
Gold is valuable. 
A fast car is fun. 
Valve a is open. 
Prolog 
valuable{ gold). 
fun(fastcar ). 
open(valvea). 
In the valuab le( gold}, valuab le is t he predicate and gold is its argument. Examples 
of some Prolog predicates which describe relationships of their arguments are illus-
t rated: 
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1 
English Prolog 
Bill likes Jane. likes ( bill,jane) . 
Bill likes Ann. likes ( bill,ann). 
Bill likes John. lik es(bill,john). 
Tom is Jack 's brother. I brother(tom,jack). 
I Pipe a is connected to pump b. I connected(pipea,pumpb ) . 
Prolog provides a concise notation to combine several objects into one. In the 
example above the predicates likes, which are in the form of Prolog facts, can be 
written in the form, like(bill,fjane, ann,johnj). Square brackets are used to represent 
a list. Each item in the list is known as an element. The firs t element of the list is 
called the head and the tail is a list comprising all the subsequent elements. 
Rules are the other form of knowledge representation. In the above examples, 
assertion of the facts is unconditional. Rules enable predicates to be conditional by 
usage of an "if" clause. For example, the Prolog rule for "Bill likes wine if the wine 
is white" is, likes (bi ll.wine) if wine(white). In other words, a rule is a conclusion 
that is known to be true if one or more other conclusions or facts are found to be 
true. 
A brief discussion of Prolog 's syntax will lead to a formal procedure for <level-
oping facts and rules in Prolog. All predicates and their arguments are a continuous 
string of characters. Also , there are no size limitations on the length of predicates or 
arguments. Prolog was developed to easily convert logic-based ideas into a written 
form. The procedure commonly used in forming facts and rules is, (1) eliminate all 
unnecessary words from sentences, (2) transform the sentence, placing the relation-
ship or attribute first, and (3) group the objects after the relationship . 
Rules and facts can be generalized by using variables. They are represented by 
arguments which have an uppercase letter as their first character. For example, 
valuable( gold) . 
valuable( diamond). 
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costsalot(Someth ing) if valuable(Something) 
implies that in order to prove that something costs a lot , first prove that it is 
valuable. Prolog operates by t rying to match all predicates with a given predicate 
(the goal). goal: cos tsalot(What). 
Prolog 's response: What = gold. 
What = diamond. 
Tru e. 
To prove costsalot{ What) is true, first t he valuable( What) has to be proven to be 
true. In other words , valuable( What) becomes the new goal. In the a t tempt to 
match the variable What with the argument found in each predicate valuable, P rolog 
will search from the top of the program to the bottom. When it finds a predicate 
that matches the goal, it binds the value to the variable so that the goal and the 
predicate are identical; the goal is said to unify with the predicate. This matching 
operation is called unification. After a unification, Prolog continues to search for 
more unifications, until there are no predicates to match, this is called backtracking. 
As can be seen. Prolog found two values for the variable What, since two valuable 
predicates were declared as facts. The relentless search for all solutions in Prolog is 
due to its backtracking capability. 
Now that variables and unification in Prolog have been introduced, we will 
re-examine lists to review in more detail the terms head and tail of a list. Instead 
of separating elements with commas. one can separate the head and tail with a (I). 
For example, (a,b .cj is equivalent to (a (b,c}j. T he following examples demonstrate 
how Prolog performs list matching (list unification), 
List 1 
fX, 1·,zj 
fear/ 
fl ,2,:J,4/ 
fa, b,c} 
List 2 
fjane,ann,john/ 
fX Y/ 
fX 1·
1 
f Importantl-J 
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Unification of lists 1 and 2 
X = jane, }' = ann, Z = john 
X = car, 1· = f/ 
x = 1, r = f2,3,f 
Important = a 
To conclude the discussion on knowledge representation, we must note that for 
proving rules, the value of some arguments of a predicate is not needed. Prolog 
allows this by use of the character ( _) . Suppose in the predicate letters(f a,b,c/) , we 
are only interested in the head of the list. T his is performed by attempting to unify 
letters(flmportant l-JJ with letters(f a,b.c/). Prolog replies with Important = a and 
assumes that any element in the tail satisfies this unification. 
4.2 Ite rative Techniques in Prolog 
:. lost conven tional programrrung languages allow repet ition by using FOR, 
·wHILE , and REPEAT statements . Prolog does not contain iteration capabilit ies 
in these conventional forms . T his discourages some P ascal: C, Basic and Fortran 
programmers from usi ng Prolog. Even though there is not a direct way of express-
ing iteration in Prolog, the power of this language is not restri cted. Prolog has two 
kinds of repeti tion tools: backtracking, in which it searches for multiple solu tions 
in a single query, and recursion , in which a procedure calls itself. Recursion is of-
ten said to be a "memory eater". P rolog's solution to this problem is to provide 
a special type of recursion called tail recursion which is compiled into an iterative 
loop in machine language. This means that although the program logic is exp ressed 
recursively, the complied code is as efficient as it would be in Pascal or Basic. It 
has been stated in Reference [21 ]. 
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" rec ursion is, in most cases, clearer. more logical, and less error-prone 
than the loops that conYentional languages use."" 
In what fo llows, some techniques fo r conducting repetitive processes by back-
t racking, recursion , and tail recursion are described. 
4. 2 .1 B acktracking 
As was mentioned, a procedure backtracks when it looks for another solution 
to a goal that has already been sat isfied. One can force backt racking by using the 
built-in predicate fai l, which causes the rules containing it to always fail. It seems, 
in any logic problem, the objecti,·e is always to satisfy premises in order to be able 
to reach a conclusion . vVhy have rules which always fail ? The following example 
explains the reason for this. Suppose facts are declared: 
comput er language(basic ) . 
comput erlanguage(pascal) . 
comput erlanguage( prolog) . 
comput erlanguage{lisp ) . 
comput erlanguage(fortran) . 
The rule printlanguages utilizes the p redicate fa il to create a loop which prints all 
languages declared as facts a bove. 
printlanguages if 
computer language{X ) and 
writ e(.\ ) and 
fail. 
printlanguages. 
If the goal printlanguages is given to Prolog, it first looks for a solution for comput-
erlanguage{X ) . in other words , it tries to find a value for X by unifying the predicate 
comput erlanguage with the availab le facts, then it writes t he value for X and fails. 
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Since write( X ) does not have any other solutions. it backtracks to computerlan-
guag e( X ) . This is repeated five times since fi\'e computer languages are declared as 
facts. After all the al ternati ves fo r computerlanguage(X ) have been explored. t he 
first printlanguages will fail. At this time prolog tries again and finds the second 
clause which is u nconditionally true. In summary, the role of fa il in t his procedure 
is to tell Prolog to assume that a solution to the original goal has not been reached , 
and thus force it to backtrack and look for an alternative. 
Another built -in predicate is cut , which has a funct ion opposite of fa il. T his 
predicate is used extensively in recursive procedure. Whe re fail is used to promote 
backtracking, cut is used to stop it. Its value is always true, so it has no effect on 
the logic of the procedure. It acts like a diode in an electrical circuit . It allows flow 
of logic from top to bottom, however , if there is a predicate in a clause which is 
not t rue, it stops backtracking from bottom to top. 'When it is a waste of t ime and 
storage to look fo r alternative solutions or when the logic of the program requires 
the prevention of the considerat ion of alternative sub-goals . cut is used. For example 
in the rule, rule if a and b and cut and c, we are tell ing Prolog t hat we are satisfied 
with the solu t ion it finds to the sub-goals a and b. Although Prolog is able to fi nd 
multi ple solutions to the call c through backtracking, it is not allowed to backtrack 
across the cut to find an alternative solution to the call s a and b. Also, it is not 
allowed to backtrack to another clause that defines the predicate rule. 
4. 2 .2 R ecu rs io n 
The other way of expressing repet it ion is through recursion. This procedure 
lends itself to solving problems where a more complicated case of the input argu-
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The same procedure is followed until the problem is reduced to fact oria l{I ,Fact l ). 
Now the unification with the initial condition is successful and the variable Factl 
gets the value of 1. The last clause ·which multiplies the Factl and 2 is reached which 
returns a value for Fact2. This is continued until a value for Fact5 is obtained and 
therefore Answer is unified with a value. This procedure is possible because Prolog 
allocates memory to each argument of factorial in all intermediate steps. 
As illustrated above, the logic of recursion is easy to follow if one is not con-
cerned with how the computer works. Prolog is so different from other languages 
that ignorance of what computers actually do to solve a problem is often an asset 
to the Prolog programmer. There is one drawback in using recursion: it is very 
memory intensive. The use of tail recursion eliminates this memory restriction. 
In the example given above , the reason P rolog allocates memory to arguments 
of factorial is to be able to conduct the last multiplication clause. If somehow the 
recursive call was made at the end (tail) of the procedure , there would be no reason 
for keeping track of intermediate steps. In tail recursion the procedure calls itself at 
its last step. In other words, the call is made in the very last sub-goal of the clause, 
and there are no backtracking points earlier in the clause. Following is a procedure 
for factorial, written using tail recursion. 
factorial{N,FactN) if 
factorialaux(N,FactN, 1, 1 ) . 
I 
factorialaux(.1V,Fact ,l,P) if 
I < = N and N ewP = P x I and 
J N ew! = I ...J.. 1 and cut and 
I 
factorialaux (N,FactN,.VewI.NewP) . 
factorialaux ( N ,FactN,1,FactN) if 
I > .V. 
Suppose t he goal, fa ctorial( 5, A nswer) is given. In order to satisfy factorial(5, Answer), 
first Prolog must satisfy factorialaux {S, FactN,1,1 }. The values for the factorial of I 
is P when the rule factorialaux is called fo r the first time. In other words, facto rial 
of I is P, is the init ial condition. In this case I and P are one. Then the call to 
factori alaux fo r the first t ime first calculates the factorial of one N ew P = P * I , 
increments I by one, and finally calls itself. The second time factorialaux is called 
t he factori al of two is calculated. This process is repeated until I is incremented to 
6. When the new goal becomes fact orialaux{S, Fact ,6,120}, I which is six becomes 
larger than N which is five and the fi r st clause for factorialaux fails. However, the 
second factorialaux {S.Fa cLV,6, 120) succeeds and FactN gets the value of 12 0. The 
use of cut insures no backtracking after the sub-goal I < = .V fails thus the fi rst 
clause fo r factorialaux fails. The advantage of this factorial is that the rule calls 
itself as its las t sub-goal , therefore , there is not a need to store the information 
obtained in the intermediate step of the recursion. 
4.3 Turbo Pro log 
Prolog software used to develop ESAS is Turbo P rolog 2.0 developed by Borland 
International, Inc. :21 ]. 1\Iinimum hard ware requirements for this software a re: 
• IB:\I PC, X.T, AT. P S 2 or true compatible 
• 284k RA [ internal memory minimum, though 6-!0k is recommended 
• P C-DO or :\IS-DO operating systems. \·ersion 2.0 or later 
T his software has some added features which make it more attractive than 
many other expert system tools. ome of these features used in developing ES A 
are: 
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• External database system, with over 30 built-in predicates for developing and 
maintaining large databases 
• Window management tools, with several built-in predicates which create and 
manage vi r tual or normal windows 
• High resolution video support 
• Turbo linker which makes module programming possible 
• Turbo Prolog Toolbox which is a collection of already written modules in 
Prolog and C language used fo r some common tasks 
• Ylost importantly low cost 
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5 DEVELOPMEN T OF ES A S 
The acquisition and representation of knowledge and methods used for con-
structing the rules ESAS uses to perform its tasks are discussed in this chapter. 
Tasks ESAS is capable of accomplishing are as follows. Given the input and output 
components, ESAS is capable of finding paths through a system. In a search for 
paths, components could be specified as failed and thus bypassed in the search. This 
feature of ESAS enables it to accomplish its most important task. which is finding 
the cutsets of a system. As previously mentioned, cutsets are a combination of 
components whose failure causes the failure of the system. Given the failure rate of 
each component and knowing the cutsets, ESAS is then able to calculate the failure 
probability of the system. Also, by use of the cutsets found and stored. ESAS is 
able to diagnose a system by forming a failure menu tree. The failure menu tree 
contains the components whose failure causes the accident depicted in the root of 
the tree. Finally, as part of system diagnostics, "what if" scenarios are provided, 
where the user can ask whether there is a path through the system if components 
or a group of components have failed given the input and output components. 
The acquisition and representation of the information about a system stored 
as the database is described in the Section 5.1. Facts used and rules developed 
for finding paths through a system, finding cutsets , and diagnosing a system are 
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described in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, respectively. Finally, m Section 5.5, the 
interactive features of ESAS with the user are discussed. 
5 .1 Acquisition and R epresentation of Information 
The knowledge acquired by ESAS for performing its tasks is encoded into 
Prolog predicates in the form of facts. Knowledge of programming in Prolog is not 
required for using ESAS. Information is acquired in a user friendly fashion and the 
database is developed and saved in the data files. Editing the database stored in t he 
data files is also made available to the user by ESAS. It is strongly recommended 
t hat the user avoid editing the database directly and only edit the database by using 
ESAS, since files storing the database can easily become invalid if not manipulated 
by ESAS . .A description of the information acquired and its representation, encoding 
facts into Prolog predicates, are discussed in this section. 
5.1.1 S emantic Network R epresentation of a System 
The major component of the knowledge acquired by ESAS 1s the semantic 
network representation of a system. In such a network objects are represented as 
nodes and the relation between them as links. A semantic network is in the form 
of a tree or a graph . Trees are formed from nodes connected to one another in a 
fashion such that the branches cannot be connected, whereas in graphs any node 
can be connected to any other nodes or to itself. Graphs and trees can be either 
directed or non-directed. In the directed case, a link specifies the direction of the 
relationship between the nodes it connects, whereas in the non-directed graph or 
tree a link relates nodes in both possible directions. 
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In general, systems in a nuclear power plant could be represented in a directed 
graph fo rm. where nodes are components and links are the physical connections 
between the components where there is a flow of some type. For example. in a 
pumping system a pump a nd a pipe could be specified as nodes related by a flow 
of coolant in the direction. pump to pipe. Therefore. E AS when presented the 
semantic network representation of a system, makes two assumption. It assumes. 
all the links of the semantic network representation of a system constitute a flow 
of some type. For example. in a thermal hydraulic system the fl.ow of steam water 
and in an electr ical system a flow of electrical cu rrent must be present throughout 
all the links of the semantic network representation. Also , it assumes t hat one and 
only one type of flow is allowed in a system. 
However, by making these two assumptions. components such as sensors and 
relays, which are not linked to the system by a ·'flow connection 1•• can not be 
included in the semantic network representation of a system. To incorporate the 
components which can not be linked to t he system by the fl.ow connection, ··non-
flow connection" links a re introduced. Even though, components linked by non-flow 
connections do not directly influence a flow path through a system. they manipulate 
other components, linked by flow connect ions, which do influence the flow path of 
a system. In ot her words , it is crucial to included the components linked to the 
system with non-flow connection. since they play an important role in the function 
of a system. The generic term ·activator·' is used for components which are linked 
by non-flow connections in this thesis and in developing ESA.S. 
The following examples will hopefully clarify the concept of using the non-flow 
con nect ions. If a pump is funct ioning properly and is activated by a sensor, there 
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could not be any flow t hrough the pump if the sensor has failed. ln other words. 
there is a need for non-flow connection links for properly representing systems con-
taining a sensor. Another example for activator components is the relays which are 
used in electrical systems. The funct ion of relays , which is changing the operational 
mode of the switches in the ystem. can be simulated by use of non-flow connection 
links. We will address the mode of operation of switches and vah·es in ection 5.1.2. 
For properly representing a system in a semantic network form. some consid-
e rations must be made on deciding on the boundaries a nd limit of resolution of 
the system. Inside the boundaries of the system a ll components must be linked 
to the system by either flow or non-flow connections. l\loreover , as was previously 
mentioned, flow of one and only one type through all components linked by flow 
connections must exist. Systems in nuclear power plants .. vhich have more than one 
type of flow can be represented by deciding on the boundaries of sub-systems where 
there is one and only one type of flow. For example, a system which is a combi-
nation of a thermal hydraulic and an electric systems (i.e., the semantic network 
representation requires specifying links describing the flo\v of both (steam,water ) 
and electrical current), could be presented as two separate sub-systems and ana-
lyzed by simply deciding on the boundaries of the two sub-systems. For finding the 
cutset of a system, sometimes there is a need for including an output node which 
physically does not represent a component in a system. The rules for scenarios 
where such an output node is required are discussed in the Section 5.3 . 
Components in a system are represented by nodes. C sually. a component 
of a system itself consists of sub-components which in turn consist of sub-parts. 
Therefore. nodes in a semantic network actually represent macro-components which 
52 
consist of components which in tu rn consist of sub-compo nents. In an analysis of 
a system, by deciding on the limit o f resolution , the size of the macro-components 
are determined. If t he limit of resolution is high, the analysis can be done with 
high specificity; however , the analysis is more time consuming and tedio us. On 
the ot her hand, if t he limit of resolution is low , the analysis can be done faster 
but less accurately. By studying the importance of t he components in a system. 
one can compromise between the specificity of the analysis and t he time it takes to 
perform an analysis. For example, in a t hermal hydraulic system, o ne can reduce 
the number of components in a sys tem by excluding the pipes from the semantic 
network representation or by considering them as a par t of the components whom 
are connected to. Even though this measure is justifiable, due to the low failure 
probability of pipes relative to ot her components, t he analysis can not account for 
the accidents caused by failure of pipes. Therefore. in deciding o n the limit of 
resolution , o ne must consider t he desired specificity o f the analysis of the system . 
Readers wishing fo r a more elaborate description on the limit of resolution can refer 
to \'essely [l ]. 
In summary, to represent a semantic networ k representation of a system, one 
must decide on the boundaries of the system. and this decision must be made con-
sidering that flow of one and only one type must exist t hrough all components linked 
by flow connection. Also. those components in t he system which a re not linked to 
the system by a flow can be linked to the system with the non-flow connections. 
Finally, considering the specifici ty of the analysis and time required to conduct an 
analysis, one must decide on the limit of resolution. The resulting semantic net-
work representation o f a sys tem then sho uld be a deterministic entity compnsmg 
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an interacting collection of discrete elements : 1]. 
5.1.2 Othe r System Informat io n 
Other than the semant ic net work representation of the system, additional in-
fo rmation acquired by ESA includes the mode of operat ion of the .. gate type'· 
components (e.g. , valves and switches), t he failure modes and failu re rates, and the 
advisory text for diagnostic purposes. 
In a semanti c network representa ti on of a system, a component could either 
fail o r succeed. This implies that in a search for paths they are a,·oided if failed or 
passed if not failed . However, components such as switches in electrical sys tems a nd 
valves in the rmal hydraulic systems, if failed could still allow flow. For example, if 
a failed switch is closed prior to the system operation , it would st ill a llow flow of 
elect ri cal current. since it is "failed-closed"'. Therefore. in order to properly take 
the failure of gate type components into account, ES AS acquires the two modes for 
each gate type component. A mode spec ifies whether or not flow is allowed through 
a gate type component. For example, specifying an open mode o f a switch implies 
that the flow is not allowed. whereas specifying a closed mode implies that t he flow 
is allowed through the switch. 
Two modes are acqui red for each gate type component, initial and operat ional . 
The ini t ial and operational mode specify t he mode of t he gate type component prior 
to and during the operat ion of the system respectively. The rule used fo r deciding 
whi ch specified mode to use is: if the gate type component is assumed failed then 
the initial mode is used else the o perat ional mode shall be used where each mode 
can be specified either allowing flow or not allowing flow. In the case where the 
54 
modes of operation of the switches are alte red by relays. the initial and operational 
modes correspond to the mode enforced by relays when they are energized and de-
energized , are used, respectively. For example. in the case \\'here a manual switch 
is closed to begin the operation of the system it is connected to, the initial and 
operational mode of the switch can be specified as open and closed. respectively. 
The semantic network rep resentation and the gate type component specifica-
tions are used for the analyses, including finding paths. searching for cutsets, and 
diagnostics. Therefore, it is crucial to provide them to ESAS for it to be able to 
perform any tasks. The failure modes, and standby and operational failure rates . 
described next, are only used for calculating the failure probabili ty of the system; 
thus if not presented to ESA . the analyses, finding paths and cutsets and perform-
ing diagnostics can still be conducted. 
The standby and operational failure rates are defined as rates at which a compo-
nent can fail when the system is not operating and operating respectively ) j. These 
rates are used for calculating the failure probability of a component. The method 
used for calculating the failure probability of a system is described in Section 5.3. 
In Chapter 3 , we defined t he failure modes of a component. Failure modes 
are the different ways a component can fail. For each failure mode, an operational 
fai lure probability rate must be specified. A table containing different failure modes 
and their corresponding operational failure rates for most common components in 
a nuclear power plant is provided to the user by ESAS. The data for this table 
are obtained from \VASH-1-100 2·. Data required to calculate the failure rate of a 
system for components not included in this table could be entered separately. 
The information described to this point is acquired from the user and stored in 
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the database. After finding the cutsets. ES...\ stores them in the form of facts for 
diagnosing the system and calculating the probability of occurrence of an accident 
as part of the system database. Also, for diagnostic purposes. a text explaining the 
corrective actions of each component can be entered, and is stored in the database. 
ESAS then provides the text entered fo r a component when that component is found 
to be the cause of an accident in the diagnostic mode. Turbo Prolog's text editor 
is used for entering the advisory text. 
5.1.3 R e prese ntat io n o f Facts in ESAS 
The predicates used for storing the information ESAS acquires. mentioned in 
the pre\rious two sections. are listed below. 
component( component name,component lyp e, list of failure modes, 
List of operating failure probability rat es, 
standby failure probability rat e, component number) 
connected(input component, output component) 
activator( component name, list of components whom the activator 
manipulates , input component for the activator, output 
component for the activator} 
gate( component name, initial mode, operational mode) 
advisory(component name, failure mode, text) 
cuts et(type, List of output components , list of input components , 
cuts et) 
found( type, list of output components. list of input components, 
maximum number of components in a cuts et search for) 
For all of the components in a system, the predicate component is stored in 
the knowledge base. The first argument of the predicate component , component 
name is a string used as the key for searching the database. In order to be able to 
properly search the database, in acquiring the component names. ES...\ does not 
allow multiple uses of the same name (i .e ., each name must be unique). Also, there 
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is a limit on the number of characters of the argument component name, namely 
20. to reduce the database search time. 
The argument, component type could be used to describe the component type 
or other informat ion. This argument is also specified as a st ring; however, the 
limit on the number of bytes this string could haYe is 6-!K . which is the maximum 
allowable size of a string type arguments specified by the Turbo Prolog compiler 
[21 ]. The argument , fai lure modes is a list of st rings which contains the failure 
modes of the component. For each failure mode, the corresponding operational 
failure rates are stored in the argument operat ional failure probability ra te, specified 
as a list of real numbers. The standby failure probability rate is then used to store 
the standby failure probability rate, declared as a real number. The argument 
component number is an integer which is used fo r sorting the component prec:licates 
in the database. 
The predicate connected is used to represent the fl ow connect ion links. Its first 
argument is the component name of the input of the link and the second argument 
the output. The prec:licate activator is used for specifying components which are 
linked to the system by non-flow con nections. The third and four th arguments 
of this predicate are used for representing relays and they contain the name of 
components which are the power source and the ground for the relay. respectively. 
Gate type components a re represented by the prec:licate gat e which stores the initial 
and operational mode as its arguments. The text used after diagnosing a system 
for advisory purposes is stored in the predicate advisory. This text is sto red as the 
third argument of the prec:licate adi·isory. which is declared as string and thus has 
a maximum size limit of 64K bytes. 
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The cutsets found are sto red in the predicate cu ts et. The predicate found 
is stored in the database for informing ESAS that a search for cutsets has been 
performed and therefo re pre\'enting a redundant search even if no cutsets were found 
in t he search . T he information contained in the arguments of these components is 
described in Section 5.3. 
The pumping system depicted in Figure 5.1 is identical to the one in Figure 
3.1: however, to demonstrate the representation of an activator and a gate type 
component, components s ensor which activates pump a and pump band valve which 
is connected to t he outpu t o f pump a and pump band the input of the core, specified 
to be closed in the initial mode and open in operational mode, are included. In 
presenting the information for the pumping system, the failure rates were not given , 
thus , the value of zero is assigned by ESAS. The predicates developed for storing the 
information entered for the pumping system depicted in Figure 5 .1 are presented 
belo•v . 
component(tank,storage tank. flank is empty,'.[O '. 0 .1 ) 
component( pump a,pump ,fpump failure.failure du e t o no power ',{0,0 1, 0.2) 
component(pump b,pump,/pump failure,failure du e to no power/ ,{0,0 1,0,J) 
component( valve, manual valve ,[Jailed clos edj ,f 0 J, 0, 4) 
component( output, core ,{1,f I, 0, 5) 
component( sensor,low leve l sensor,/sensor failure ',/ 0 /,0,6) 
connected( tank,pump a) 
connec t ed( tank.pump b) 
connec t ed(pump a. valve) 
connec t ed(pump b, valve) 
connec l ed( valve, output) 
activat or(sensor, fpump a,pump bj ,non e, none} 
gate( valve , clos ed, open) 
Pu"p o 
Pvr-ip b 
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Figure 5.1: The configuration of the modified pumping system 
5.2 R ules for Find ing Pnt hs Throug h a System 
As was mentioned in the previous section, we represented the semantic network 
of a system in the form of a directed graph. In defining a graph, branches could 
be connected. This suggests that there is a possibility of the existence of a loop in 
a graph. A loop is <le fined as a path in which a no de is visited more than once. 
Therefore, tracing a graph as it is represented will not be successful in the cases 
where a loop exists. Howeve r, in trees, no loops are atlowed by definitio n. srnce 
branches cannot be connected. Thus, by transforming a graph representation into 
a tree representation of a system, the search for a path could be done without 
the fear o f encountering loops. This transformation is demonstrated in Figure .5.2. 
Kowalski [19], could be referred to for the topic of graph transformati on . 
There arc several techniques used for tracing through a tree, one of which is 
callee..! depth-first search. The essence of this technique is to pick some alte rnative 
a t ever.'· node \'i sited and to work forward from that alternative. Other altern a ti\'es 
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Figure 5.2 : A l ree rep resenta tion of a g r a ph 
al the same le vel are ignored completely as long as there is a hope of reaching the 
destination by use of the original choice. The start ing point for t his search is t he root 
o f the tree o r the top node and going fo rward constit u tes moving do\\'n and left as 
far as possible. For example , i n finding a pat h between nodes (a) and (g) of the t ree 
d epicted in Figure 5.2, this method searches through the t ree, as is demonstrated. 
Paths . in the order di scovered , a re (a, b,c,f,g), (a,d,e ,f.g), an<l (a,h ,i,g). 
-
The task of transforming the graph into a t ree could be accomplished by avoid-
ing re- visitatio n o f a compo nent in a search for a path. Thi s simple rule of thumb . 
to not al low the revisiting of a compone nt in exploring a path , could ea~ily be pro-
gramrncd into a P rolog rule whi ch conducts a depth -first search. This ru le uses 
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the directed graph representation of a system and finds paths without falling in 
the traps of loops which can exist in graphs. ESAS's Prolog procedure for tracing 
through a directed graph is, 
findpath (_, Dest,(Dest1 Tail/,(Destl Tail/). 
findpath(Start,Dest,(Last l Tail /,List) if 
connected( Last,.\.) and 
not(m ember(X. Tail)} and 
opengate(X) and 
findpath(Star t,Des t , .\.Las t TaiZ,1,List) . 
m ember(X. (X l-/J . 
m ember(.\.(_ } J if member(.\ . r ). 
The rule findpath is written in a tail recursi\·e form; thus , it is not memory 
intensive. Csing a tail recursive procedure for finding paths is essential. since sys-
terns wit h a large number of components and connections soon exhaust the stack 
memory storage required for ordinary recursiYe procedures . Refer to Chapter 4 for 
a description of tail recursive procedures. 
The first and second arguments o f the predicate findpa th are the start and the 
destination nodes , respect ively. T he third a rgument is a list of nodes already visited 
in the path being explored and other nodes specified to be avoided in the search 
for a path. By searching the database for connected predicates , the next node to 
be visited .\ is found. The existence o f the node .\ in the path is then examined 
by using the procedure member. The procedure member is also tail recursive. Its 
task is basically to see if the node .\ specified in its first argument is a member of 
the list in it s second argument which contains the li st o f nodes already visited. By 
doing so, circling in loops of a graph in a search for a path is avoided. 
The procedure opengate is not lis ted here si nce it is rather lengthy. The task 
of this procedure is to check whether t he node specified as its argument is a gate 
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type. This is accomplished by checking the database fo r predicates gate . If .\ is 
not a gate type component then opengate automatically succeeds. However. if it 
is a gate type component then opengate decides whether t he gate type component 
is in the mode which allows flow or vice versa. The opengate proced ure is written 
to cover various scenarios possible concerning their con nections with the system. 
In develo ping ESAS , it was intended to not specialize on a type of system. For 
accomplishing this. all possible forms a gate type component functions had to be 
considered. However, it is impossible to cover all scenarios, which in t urn resulted 
in restricting the use of ESAS to systems that contain gate ty pe components which 
are considered in opengate procedure . The scenarios CO\'e red concerning gate type 
components are valves or switches, valves which are connected to sensors. switches 
which are connected to relays, and switches whose mode of operation is a ltered by 
activator components other than relays. 
The path finding procedure calls itself until t he boundary condi tion displayed 
in the first predicate of this p rocedure succeeds. This predicate simply checks 
whether the destination is reached . If the destination is reached then it retu rns 
the path found by it s fourth arguments. If the destination is not reached , the 
second predicate is called again. The backtracking feature of Prolog enables the 
path fi nding proced ure to explore all the possibilities fo r ex.istence of a path in a 
depth-first search manner. 
5.3 Rules for Finding Cutsets and Failure Pro bability of a Syste m 
In this section the methods used for developing the rules fo r finding the cutsets 
a re discussed. Two methods are proposed for finding the cutsets of a system. The 
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two methods are deri ved from the simple observation that systems in nuclear power 
plants fail in two ways. In the first case, no flow from input component(s) to the 
output component constitutes an accident, and in the second case the opposite 
constitutes an accident. Finding the cutsets in the first case is called the "no-fl.ow 
analysis'· and the second case " fl.ow analysis." 
Generally, the no-flow analysis is performed for t hermal hydraulic systems 
where no flow to the outpu t component causes an accident and fl.ow analysis is 
performed for electrical systems, consisting of a combination of relays and switches, 
designed to block t he fl.ow of electricity to the ou tput component to stop its oper-
ation. Also, an analysis which performs both A.ow and no-fl.ow analyses could be 
performed for thermal hyd rauli c systems which have a test loop. Thus, in normal 
operation a fl. ow to the normal outpu t component wit h no flow to the output com-
ponent of the test loop are desired. These analyses for finding cutsets cover most 
accident scenarios possible in nuclear power plant systems. The use of ESAS for 
finding cutsets is restricted to the above analyses, even though it was intended to 
make the use as general as possible. 
\.Vhen the type o f analysis is acquired from the user, ESAS asks for the output 
component of the system. For performing either A.ow o r no-fl.ow analysis, specifi-
cation of one and only one output component is allowed by ESAS. In the analysis 
where the combination of both A.ow and no-fl.ow is desired. specification of two out-
put components are allowed (i.e., one and only one output component to which fl.ow 
and another to which no flow is desired). As is commonly known . most systems in 
nuclear p ower plants have more than one output component. However , the seman-
t ic network representation of those system wit h more than one ou t pu t component 
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can be manipulated to have only one output component. by considering the type 
of analysis desired. Only four cases emerge. In the case where no flow to all of 
the output components of a system causes an accident, no-flow analysis could be 
performed by specifying each output component separately and performing the no-
flow analysis for all of the outputs component individually. Then the accumulated 
cutsets obtained from the no-flow analysis for each output component is the list 
of cutsets desi red. In the second case, where no flov.: to any of the output compo-
nents of a system causes an accident, a node which physically does not represent 
any component in the system can be specified as the outpu t node by linking it as 
an output of all the actual output components. The third case, where flow to all 
output components of a system causes an accident , is analogous to the second case 
a nd therefore the same manipulation of the semantic network could be applied. 
And finally, the fourth case where flow to any of the output components causes an 
accident is analogous to the first case. Thus, the same procedure could be followed. 
The task of specifying the input components to the system is less complex. 
For no-flow analysis, normally all the components which are not an output of any 
other components are the input components of the system. For performing flow 
analysis of electrical systems, normally, power sources can be specified as the input 
components of the system. 
In specifying the input and output component(s), a great deal of care must be 
used since it could affect the result of the analysis performed for finding cutsets. 
Afterwards, acquiring the type of analysis desired, the output component, and input 
components ESAS begins the actual search for finding the cutsets. 
First. E A examines the type of analysis selected to be performed. If no-
flow or flow analyses are selected, assurrung all the components are functioning 
properly. there must be a path o r no paths between the specified input components 
and the output component of the system. If these conditions are not met then 
ESAS terminates the search for cutsets immediately; otherwise it continues with 
the analysis. 
Cutsets are a list of components whose failure causes the failure of the system. 
This definition is used to introduce a rule of thumb by which ESA finds cutsets. 
In the case o f p erforming no-flow analysis, assuming an arbitrary list of components 
have failed in the system: if there are no paths between the input components and 
the output component. then by definition, this arbitrary list of components is a 
cutset. On the ot her hand. in performing flow analysis, if there is a path. then 
t he list of the arbitrary compo nents is a cutset. This rule of thumb. although very 
elementary, is extremely successful for finding the cutsets as will be demonstrated 
in the next chapter where four systems which are similar to most systems in nuclear 
power plants are analyzed. 
When the pat h finding procedure is called to explore the possibility of the ex-
istence of a path , the list of assumed failed components , except the gate type and 
the activator type components, are transferred by use of the third argument into 
t he findpath procedure. As was mentioned in the previous sect ion, in a search for a 
path the components included in this list are avoided. ln Section 5.1, the activator 
components were defined to be components which do not directly influence the flow 
path of a system, however , they manipulate other components which do. To simu-
late the failure of an activator component, the list of components, excluding the gate 
type components, which are manipulated by the activator component are included 
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in the list of components to be avoided in a search for a path. In transferring the 
list of components assumed failed. we include all components . except the gate type 
components, since failure of gate type components require a different treatment . 
Namely, to simulate the failure of t he gate type com ponents, the specified initial 
mode is used to decide whether there could be a flow through this component as 
was explained in ection 5.1. 
ESAS is capable of finding cutsets containing up to six components. It first 
begins by searching fo r cutsets containing only one component. If there are~ com-
ponents in the system t hen there a re ~-1 suspects containing only one component, 
since the output component is not considered as a possib le cutset. By calling the 
path finding routine :\-1 times. ESAS can then find all the cutsets contain ing one 
component. Then, in the search for culsets consist ing of two components, there are 
(N-1)!, factorial of ( T-1), lis ts of components as suspects. However, the number of 
suspec ts are reduced by eliminating all those on the list which are a super set of 
the cutsets containing only one component previously found . The definition of the 
super set is that set A is the super set of set B if all of the elements in set B are a 
member o f set A. The elimination of these lists are obvious since, if component A 
is found to be a cutset then the failure of the combination of component A and any 
other components in the system can also cause the failure of the system; however, 
this combination is not a proper cutset. Also, lists containing a component twice 
are eliminated, since they are the same as the list with only one component which 
has already been considered as a poss ible cutset. Thus, after forming the lists con-
taining two components and eliminating the improper ones, the path finding routine 
is called to find the actual cutsets. 
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In forming lists composed of components in the system as suspects for being a 
possible cutset. all of the components (except the output component ) are included 
for no flow analysis. Ho\vever, in flow analysis where a flow to the output component 
consti tu tes as accident, only the activator and gate type components are included 
in the list of suspects. This becomes apparent by realizing that when a flow to 
the output component constitutes an accident. components such as a wire which 
should allow flow at all times can not be assumed failed. This is referred to as the 
"no-miracle rule'" in Vessely ' l . Thus, only the components which can enforce no 
flow under normal operation can be considered to fail in t he flow analysis. 
The same procedure is followed for finding lists containing three to six compo-
nents as proper suspects. The path finding routine is called and the actual cutsets 
are found. As can be seen, the number of suspects increases factorially, as the num-
ber of components in the system or in the li st of suspects increases. In order to 
decrease the analysis time, it is imperative to properly decides on the limit o f reso-
lution. which in turn determines the number of components in the system. Also, for 
reducing the analysis time, in most analyses the failure probability of components 
in the cutsets with more than two components becomes insignificant; thus ES AS 
enables user to specify the the maximum number of components in a cutset desired 
in order to avoid searching for cutsets containing higher number of components. 
The cutsets found are then stored. Thus a search for cu tsets is only performed 
once and t he user can search for cutsets containing a higher number of components 
without repeating the search for the cutsets previo usly fo und and stored. Cutsets 
must also be stored for diagnostic purposes where the response time becomes a 
major factor. 
67 
A no-fl.ow analysis was performed on the pumping system depicted in Figure 
5.1, specifying components tank and core as the input and output components of 
the system, res pectively. In this analysis, ESAS was asked to search for lists of 
component(s) whose failure cause no A.ow from the storage tank to the core. That 
the failure of the components. tank or valve or sensor or (pump a and pump b ), 
causes the system to fail was concluded from this analysis. The Predicates used to 
store the Prolog facts representing the cutsets fo und are: 
cuts et( no-fiow,f outputj, tank,(tank/} 
cuts et( no-flow.( output/, tank, (valve J} 
cuts et( no-fiow,(outputj, tank,{sensorj} 
cutset(no -fiow,f outputj, tank,{pump a,pump bj} 
I f ound(no- fiow,(outputj,tank,2} 
After finding the cutsets. the failure of the system can be calculated. ESAS 
acquires the operational and standby t ime of the system. Then the product of the 
sum of the operational failure rates and the operational time added to the product 
of the standby failure rate and standby time of the components in a cutset is the 
failure probability of the components in the cutset. By adding the probabili t ies 
obtained for all cutsets, the failure probability of the system is obtained. Even 
though , in developing ESAS, the major task was to develop rules fo r finding cutsets, 
developing a procedure for finding th e failure probability of the system turned out 
to be more challenging. This is due to the fact that problem areas where symbolic 
manipulations are required lend themselves to programming in Prolog but not to 
numerical manipulations. This is the major factor for making the quantitative 
analysis as simple as possible. 
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5.4 Rules D evelo p ed for Diagnostics 
As was cited in Chapter 2. cutsets found could be used for systems diagnosis. 
By definition, cutsets are a list of components whose failure causes an accident . 
,,Vhen an accident occurs, the user is interested in knowi ng the possible causes, 
which in turn are the cutsets. E ,\ provides the cutsets in the form of a menu tree 
with items displaying the cutsets which contain one and two components. The user 
then can select an item to be displayed. and will be shown the failure modes and the 
text entered for explaining the suggested corrective actions. This could be used as 
an on line tool for quick reference to technical specificat ions for corrective actions in 
the case of a failure of a component (pro,·ided this information is pre,·iously entered 
into ESAS). 
Also as part of diagnostics , to examine the importance of successfu l operation 
of component(s) in the system, the path finding procedure could be directly called 
by the user. ESAS acquires the input and output components. and the components 
which are assumed failed , and displays the paths found (if any ). The components 
assumed failed are treated as was mentioned in the previous section. This featu re 
becomes attractive for studying complex and la rge systems. For example, the large 
drawings of reactor trip systems which depict hundreds of components such as 
relays , switches, diodes, etc. could be used once to enter the semantic network 
representation of the system. Then ESAS could be used to t race through the system 
searching for pat hs from any component to any other component with the option 
of bypassing component(s). 
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5.5 Interacting with ESAS 
A useful expert system must possess a non-intimidating and user friendly in-
teractive capability. As a matter of fact, in theory, there should not be a need for 
a user 's manual when employing an expert system. All actions taken by an expert 
system must be explained . warnings must be given to the user when necessary, while 
the expert system is in use. In other word. the manual for using an expert system 
must be provided by the expert system itself. so that the expert system is compa-
rable to human experts in interacting with the user. In this section , a description 
of how ESAS can interact with the user is provided. However. by no means can 
this brief description be used as a manual. since E A is developed to display the 
explanatory texts, warnings, and other necessary information while being used. 
In order to make ESAS user friendl y, it is developed to be menu driven. The 
diagram depicting the various options of ESAS is presented in Figure 5.3. vVhen 
scanning the menu. a text explaining tasks performed by selecting t he option under 
consideration is presented to the user. The actions of ESA are partitioned into ma-
nipulating the database, finding cutsets, and performing diagnostics. :Vlanipulating 
the database consists of tasks, CO~Sl'LTing, CREA.Ting, EDITing, DELETing, 
and VIE,Ving the database. ~eedless to say. before editing or viewing a database. 
finding cutsets, or performing diagnostics, the database of the system must be cre-
ated, or if already created , it must be consulted . 
When creating a new database, the first information acq uired by ESA is the 
system name. The system name is used as the title of the files created by E AS for 
storing the database. Thus, the database of a system is referred to by the assigned 
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system name. ESAS acqmres information by use of vi rtual windows . where page 
editing is provided. or by use of menus. For example. in acquiring t he component 
names, ESAS creates a virtual wi ndow which contains :.J' fields, where ~ is the 
specified number of components in the system. The user edits the en tire window 
when entering the component names. After all component names have been entered , 
ESAS searches for improper entries (e .g., a component name entered twice) . Then. 
ESAS encodes the component name into the corresponding predicates to be stored 
in the database. in the form of Prolog facts. The component names need to be 
entered only once. since a menu containing the component names is created to be 
used fo r acquiring other information such as specifying gate type components or 
connections. 
In general , when using ESAS , the user ra rely needs to enter info rmation with-
o u t use of menus and when menus are not provided page editing capabi li ties are 
provided. In addition to displaying the database on screen, ESAS is able to wri te 
the database into data files or produce printed copies of it. ESAS always asks for 
information from and replies to the user in English sentences, not P rolog predicates . 
The tasks performed by choosing the second or thi rd option (i.e., finding cutsets 
o r performing diagnostics ). discussed in pre\·ious sections, are systematic and self 
explanatory. 
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6 ANALYSIS OF N UCLEAR PLANT SYSTEMS 
Four systems were chosen to demonstrate the features of ESAS and to illustrate 
the success of ESAS in finding cutsets. 
6.1 An Emergen cy Core Cooling System 
A simplified emergency core cooling System (ECCS), depicted in Figure 6.1 , 
obtained from Lewis [25], was analyzed by ESAS. The pipes in this system were 
excluded from the analysis for simplifying this demonstration. As can be seen, the 
semantic network representation of this system includes nine components, with the 
coolant tank and core as the input and output components of the system and the 
valves a, b. c and d as gate type components which are specified as closed prior 
to and open dur ing the operation of the system. The protection system sensor 
is specified as an activator type which activates pumps a and b. Considering the 
accident of having no flow to the core from the coolant tank, ESAS was asked to 
find cutsets containing a maximum of four components and found the cutsets to be, 
(coolant tank) or (protection system sensor) or (pump a and pump b) or (pump a 
and valve c and valved ) or (pump band valve a and valve b) or (valve a and rnlve 
b and valve c and valve cl). These cutsets can easily be verified by inspecting the 
ECCS. Also, they were verified by performing a fault tree analysis for the top event, 
Coolant tonk 
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no flow to the core. The fault tree constructed for ECCS, obtained form Reference 
[26j, is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
To demonstrate the diagnostics features of ESAS, a search for paths between 
the components coolant tank and core was done, assuming the failure of vah·es a 
and d . Paths found were (coolant tank, pump a, valve b, core) and (coolant tank, 
pump b , valve c, and core). 
To perform diagnostics for the accident, no flow to the core, ESAS formed the 
failure menu tree depicted in Figure 6.3. From this menu, the user can choose the 
failure of a single component and will be presented with the failure modes of that 
component previously entered in the database. For each failure mode, an advisory 
text can be put in the database; by consulting this, the user can take corrective 
actions. For example, this text can contain the technical specifications related to 
the failure of a component. 
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6.2 A Press ure Tank System 
Figure 6.4 shows a pressure tank system (PTS), obtained from Vessely [1]. The 
function of this system is to regulate the operation of the pump. This pumping sys-
tern provides coolant from an infinite reservoi r to the pressurized tank. The pressure 
switch has contacts which are closed when the tank is empty. When the th res hold 
pressure has been reached, the pressure switch contacts open, de-energizing the coil 
of relay K2 so that relay K2 contacts open, removing power from the pump. 
Initially, switch S 1 contacts are open, relay Kl contacts are open. and relay 
K2 contacts are open; i.e. the control system is de-energized. In this de-energized 
state the contacts of the timer relay are closed. 
System operation is started by momentarily depressing switch Sl. This applies 
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Figure 6.4: The configuration of the pressure tank system 
power to the coil of relay Kl, thus closing relay Kl contacts. Relay K 1 is now 
elect rically self-latched. The closure of relay Kl contacts allows power to be applied 
to the coil of relay K2, whose contacts close to start up the pump motor. 
The timer relay has been provided to allow emergency shut-down in the e\·ent 
that the pressure switch fails closed. Initially the timer relay contacts are closed 
and the timer relay coil is de-energized. Power is applied to the timer coil as soon as 
relay Kl contacts are closed. This starts a clock in the timer. If the clock registers 
60 seco nds of continuous power application to the timer relay coil, the timer relay 
contacts open, breaking the circuit to the Kl relay coil and thus producing system 
shut-down. 
The undesired event chosen is rupture of pressure tank after the start of pump-
mg. The fault tree developed for this undesired event is presented in \"essely ) ) . 
In the fault tree analysis performed in Vessely, the failure of switches connected to 
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relays are not taken into account, o r their failure are included with the failure of 
the relays they are connected to. 
The semantic network representation of this system includes. batteries 1 and 
2, switches (S, Sl, SKl , SK2 , and SK3) , relays (t ime relay (TR), Kl , and K2) , and 
motor, where SKl , SK2. and SK3 are the names assigned to switches connected to 
relays Kl , K2 , and TR, respectively. As can be seen, the pressure tank is excluded 
from the analysis, since the undesired event can be translated to energizing the 
motor after the start of pumping. This measure has to be taken since the pressure 
tank is not connected to the system by a fl.ow of electrical current, nor can it be 
linked to t he system by non-Row connections . The switches specified as gate type 
components are specified as closed in the initial mode (or the energized mo.de if 
connected to a relay) and open in the operational mode (or de-energized mode if 
connected to a relay). By doing so, a no-Row analysis can be performed where the 
battery 2 and motor are the input and t he output components, respectively. The 
cutsets found by performing the fault tree analysis are ~ l ], (pressure tank) or (K2) 
or (Sand Kl ) or (S and T R ) or (S and Sl ) . ESAS , in finding the cutsets. could 
not find the failure of the pressure tank, since it was not included in the semantic 
network representation of the system. However, since the failure of switches are 
included in the no-flow analysis performed by ESAS, t hey appear in the list of 
cutsets found. The cutsets found by ESAS are , (K2) or (SK2 ) or (S and K l) or (S 
and SKl) or (S and TR) or (S and SK3) or (Sand Sl ). 
The cutsets found by performing fault tree analys is are included in the list 
of cutsets found by ESAS, excep t the failure of the pressure tank. The analys is 
performed by ESAS is a more accurate one, since the failure of switches connected 
7 
to the relays are also fo und. 
6 .3 The PWR Co ntain m e nt Spray I nject io n System 
T he PWR containment spray injection system (PWRCSIS), obtained from 
WASH-1400 [2], is chosen to demonstrate the need for performing a flow and no-
flow analysis for finding all of the lis ts of components whose failure can cause an 
accident. This system is depicted in Figure 6.5. The function of this system during 
normal operation is to supply a flow to header nozzles in either subsystems A or 
B. However, at the same time, no flow through the feedback loops, back to the 
refueling water storage tank is desired. Thus. flow to the header nozzle sub-systems 
and no flow to the storage tank are desired. 
T he components included in the semantic network representation of the system 
are: manual valves (V4A , V4B), motor operated valves (CSlOOA , CSlOOB, CSlOlA, 
CSlOlB , CSlOlC, CSlOlD ), check valves (VCS-15x(1A), VCW-15x(1 B)) . These 
gate type components are ini t ially specified to be closed and during system operation 
specified to be open. Valves (V2A, V2B, V2C), and check valves (V3A, V3B ) are 
also included in the semantic network representation, but a re specified to be open 
and closed during the initial and operational mode of the system, respectively, since 
they are a part of the feedback loops. Other components included in the semantic 
network representation are: refueling water storage tank, filters (1-CS-FL-lA , 1-CS-
F L- lB ), pumps (1-CS-P-l A, 1-CS-P-lB ), and header nozzle subsystems A and B. 
Finally a node, called out put , which does not represent a component in the system, 
is required to properly represent the ou tput components of the system. See Section 
5.3 for a m ore elaborate description of the need for including t his component in the 
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semantic network representation . 
By performing a flow analys is , two cutsets containing three components are 
found, namely (\'3A and V2A and V2C) or (\'3B and V2B and V2C). This is 
apparent, since if all of the valves in each of the cutsets fail t hen they remain in 
the initial mode which is specified as open , thus allowing flow back through the 
feedback loop to the refueling water storage tank. 
By performing a no- flow analysis. only one cutset containing one component 
was found, namely (storage tank ). It is readily apparent that two parallel paths 
to the outpu t components are present: one of which start s with component V 4A. 
and ends at subsystem A and the other which starts V 4B and ends at subsystem 
B (called paths A and B , respectively) . In each path, t wo motor operated valves 
(MOV) are put in parallel. Excluding these MOV s in both paths , t here are six 
components in each path . By searching for cutsets containing two components , 36 
cutsets were found , namely, all t he non- redundant combinations of all components of 
path A with path B. For example, cutsets (A and B ) and (B and A) are redundant. 
T he search for cutsets containing three components resulted in 12 cutsets , 
namely, the combination of parallel :VlOVs in pat h A with the six components 
in path B and parallel :\IOVs in path B with the six components in path A. Finally, 
one cutset containing four components was found namely, parallel MOVs in paths 
A and B. The cutsets found were identi cal to the ones obtained in WASH-HOO [2]. 
6.4 A Power Distribution Box 
The power distribution box system, depicted in Figure 6.6, obtained from Ves-
sely [1:, is analogous to PTS since it is de vised to cutoff the power supply to the 
+ '' 
l.&fTUl 'I' I 
81 
UHllQH &l 
. 
...L.f:' II 
~ .. 
1U1 C.fl llfl 
I . 
I 
I 
.-1+-~.-~------0....:.._:. ~:·· 
14ff(llllY 1 C. r 
I 
Figure 6 .6: The configuration of the power dist ribution box 
outp ut components, motors 1, 2, and 3. However, it is more complex. 
With contacts KTl, KT2, and KT3 normally closed, a momentary dep ression 
of push-button Sl applies power from battery 1 to the coils of relays Kl and K2. 
Then the relays Kl and K2 close and remain electrically latched. Next, a 60-second 
test signal is impressed through K3, the purpose being to check prope r ope ration of 
mo tors 1, 2, and 3. Once K3 has closed, power from battery 1 is app lied to the coils 
o f relays K-1 and K5. The closure o f K4 starts motor 1. Th·e closure o f KS applies 
power form battery 2 to the coil o f K6 and also starts motor 2. Finally. the closure 
o f K6 applies power from battery 1 to the coil of K7 . Closure of K7 star:s moto r 3. 
After an interval o f 60 seconds K3 is supposed to open, shut ti ng down the 
operation of all th ree motors . Should K3 fail closed after the expirat ion of 60 
seconds , all t hree t imers (KTl, KT2 , KT3) open, de-energizing t he coil o f Kl , 
thus shutti ng down system operatio n. Suppose K3 opens properly at the end of 60 
seconds, but K4 fai ls closed. In that case, KT l opens to de-energize K l and moto r 
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1 stops. KT2 and KT3 act similarly to stop motor 2 or motor 3 should either K5 
or K 7 fail closed. 
The undesired event is the overrun of any motor after test is initiated. The 
cutsets found in Vessely [l ], by performing fault tree analysis for overrun of motor 
1 are, (Kl and K4) o r (K4 and Sl) or (K4 and KTl) or (Kl and K3) or (K3 and 
Sl) or (K3 and KTl and KT2 and KT3). The cutsets found for overrun of motor 
2 are, (K5 and K2) or (K5 and Kl ) or (K5 and KT2) or (K5 and Sl ) or (K3 and 
Kl) or (K3 and Sl ) or (K3 and KTl and KT2 and KT3). The cutsets found for 
overrun of motor 3 are, (Kl and K7) or (K2 and k7) or (K7 and KT3 ) or (K7 and 
Sl) or (Kl and K3 ) or (K3 and Sl) or (K3 and KTl and KT2 and KT3). 
The semantic network representation of this system includes all relays . and 
switches depicted in Figure 6.6, in addition to all switches connected to the relays. 
By inspecting the cutsets found by performing the fault tree analysis, one can see 
that Vessely combined the failure of the switches connected to the relays with the 
failure of t he relays t hey a re connect to. Thus, failure of a relay can be due to the 
failure of the relay or the failure of the switches it is connected to. In the analysis 
performed by ESAS, the failure of these switches were also taken into account . 
Similar to the semantic network representation of the P TS , all switches in this 
system are specified to be initially closed. They then open during the operation of 
the system. To analyze this accident with ES.AS , flow analysis was performed three 
times where in the first analysis, the battery 1 and motor 1, in the second analysis, 
the battery 2 and motor 2, and in the third analysis, the battery 2 and motor 3 are 
chosen to be the input and output components, respectively. 
The cutsets found by ESA.S included all cutsets found by Vessely, which were 
3 
obtained by performing fault tree analysis. Additional cutsets found were composed 
of switches connected to relays which were excluded from the analysis performed in 
\iessely. For example, in addition to the cutset (Kl and K4), the cutsets (SKl and 
K4) , (SK l and SK4), and (Kl and SK4) were found by ESAS, where SKl and SK4 
are the names assigned to switches connected to relays Kl and K-± , respectively. Or 
in addition to the cutset (K4 and 1), the cutset ( K4 and Sl ) were also found by 
E AS. Thus the result of the analysis performed by ES..\S is more accurate than 
the one reported in Vessely. 
\Vhen we state the analysis performed by ESA is more accurate than the one 
obtained by performing fault tree analysis. we do not imply that the same accuracy 
can not be achieved with fault tree analysis. However we do imply that if the 
accuracy is increased the fault tree analysis will become even more complex and 
tedious. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 R estriction on T y p es of Sys t em s Analy zed by ESAS 
In Chapter-!, the advantages of programming in Tur bo Prolog '21] were cited . 
One of the most useful advantages was being able to program in modules. This 
feature of Turbo Prolog allowed us to develop ESAS in stages. The evolving stages 
were formed by at tempting to analyze new types of nuclear power plant systems 
in the order they were encountered , based on the fact t hat the components of 
these systems have to be related to one another by a flow type. The systems 
which were used in developing ESAS in the order they were encountered are the 
systems included in Chapter 6, in Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. By studying 
the functions of these systems and their components, we modified the knowledge 
base of ESAS (i.e., rules for finding paths and cutsets) so that the function of 
these systems and thei r components can be simulated and analyzed by ES AS. This 
resulted in including new definitions such as "non-flow connections" to incorporate 
relationships other than "flow" between components etc. in the knowledge base of 
ESAS as was described in Chapter 5. 
Originally, we intended to make the use of ESAS as general as possible. How-
ever , we recognize that it is impossible to simulate the function of all of the com-
ponents in a nuclear p ower plants with only being a ble to simulate the function 
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of components contained in the three systems described in the first three sections 
of Chapter 6. At the same time, we hope the reader recognizes that these three 
systems are typical of most systems in nuclear power plants. In conclusion, use of 
ESAS for finding paths in a system is restricted to those systems where flow of one 
and only one type is present through all components of the system. Also, the use 
of ESAS for finding cutsets is restricted to those systems which can be analyzed 
in terms of flow or no-flow and whose components have functions which can be 
simulated by the rules in the knowledge base of ESAS. 
7 .2 Suggestio ns for Future Work 
It was reasoned in the previous section that the use of ESAS can be generalized 
by incorporating function of the components which are not now included in the rules 
used by ESAS. By including analyses other than flow and no-flow, use of ESAS can 
be broadened to a larger variety of systems. However, by expanding ESAS, a 
memory management problem can arise. 
ESAS is written in modules which are compiled and linked to an executable 
program by the Turbo Prolog compiler [21 ]. The executable program of ESAS can 
be run on an IBM XT, AT, or compatible. The size of the operating memory of 
these computers is 640K bytes minus the memory required for the operating system 
program DOS itself which requires approximately 75K bytes. The executable ver-
sion of ESAS requires approximately ..J:OOK bytes just for the rules of the knowledge 
base. When analyzing a system, the memory required for consulting the database 
of a system must be added to the 400K bytes. Therefore, this constitutes a size 
limitation on the memory required for the database of a system which in turn trans-
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lates to a size limitation on the number of components a system can contain. This 
size limitation can be increased by overlaying ESAS. T hose modules of ESAS which 
perform a task (e.g ., finding paths) can be compiled to an executable program. 
Then, ESAS will be comprised of several smaller executable programs which can 
be run by using a main program. By doing so, the executable programs, which are 
activated by the main program, will be smaller in size thus allowing more space 
for the consulted database of a system. Also, by overlaying ESAS, we alleviate the 
problem of memory limitation when expanding it to include rules which incorporate 
additional component and system functions . 
The diagnostics features of ESAS can also be improved by simulating the func_: 
ti on of more component types. As was described earlier, the function of gate and 
activator type components a re the only ones simulated by ESAS. Other than the 
function of these types of components, components either succeed which implies 
that a flow is allowed through them or vise versa if they fail. Therefore, only 
a qualitative analysis of components are possible. For example , if a pump fails 
we can not simulate the coast down period where partial fl.ow is available, or if a 
pipe ruptures flow is completely cut-off, even though there can be a partial flow 
through the pipe . The function of different components can be simulated by use 
of FORTRAN programs which solve equations corresponding to the components. 
The input of these programs can be the condition of t he components and then the 
output can be the degree of success of the components in allowing flow. 
Another diagnostic feature which can be added to improve ESAS is mcorpo-
rating time dependencies. For example , in electrical systems where time relays are 
used, even though the relay is energized it does not immediately alter the mode of 
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the gate type component it is connected to. Enabling ES AS to perform an analysis 
at each time the system configuration is altered can make it possible to perform 
these types of analysis. 
To improve the interfacing capabilities , graphics programs can be included in 
ESAS which allow the user to enter a graphic representation of the system when 
enter ing the database. Then ESAS can use this graphic representation to point out 
the cutsets found or, in diagnostics mode, to point out the component s found as 
possible causes of an accident. 
In introducing the purpose of this project 1 we stated that the end product 
of fault tree analysis are the cutsets and we proposed a method by use of which 
cutsets can be found without performing fault tree analysis. However . fault trees are 
sometimes u sed by the operators of nuclear power plants for diagnostics purposes 
and for operating assistance. ES AS can be programmed to work backward form 
the cutsets and form the fault tree which if resolved will result in the cutsets found. 
This is an involved task which would requi re a great deal of effort. 
In conclusion, ESAS can successfully accomplish the tasks it was or iginally 
programmed to perform. However 1 as is demonst rated in this section, the develop-
ment of ESAS can not be considered to be completed. It is commonly known, most 
projects are never completed, since as a goal is reached others are created. 
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